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This project is a continuation of research done by Natalia Carey and John Myers. 
The first part of Natalia's research was to develop and characterize an e-glass discrete 
fiber-reinforced polyurea (DFRP) system for infrastructure applications. She then 
recommended two polyurea systems (A and B) be further examined. These polyurea 
systems were then applied to plain reinforced concrete and steel fiber reinforced concrete 
panels (SFRC). Carey found that the SFRC panels sustained less overall damage. 
For this project SFRC was used as the base layer in combination with the DFRP 
systems. In addition to the DFRP and SFRC a high-volume fly ash-wood fiber (FA-WF) 
material was added to act as a sacrificial layer on the panels. The FA-WF is a material 
that has been under development at Missouri University of Science and Technology 
(Missouri S&T). These panels were then tested with explosives at the Missouri S&T 
Mine. The panels were compared visually and analytically. The visual observations were 
used to compare dramatic differences in the panels, while more analytical means, like 
residual deflections and estimated mass loss allows panels with very similar damage to be 
compared. After comparing the results significantly less damage was observed in the 
hybrid panels that contained a foam-gap and a DFRP layer. Results from this study will 
be used to evaluate alternative construction methods and coating systems to protect at-
risk structures and their inhabitants. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 OVERVIEW 
The importance of research into blast mitigation has been increasing with the 
increasing terrorist threats (Wright and lchniowski 2002). It does not take a special 
degree or large capital to create an explosive (Michel and Herbeck 2001). Important 
cultural and governmental buildings present themselves as targets for adversaries and due 
to the lack of consideration for blast in the design of buildings, many of these buildings 
are at risk of collapsing after an explosive attack, resulting in fatalities. However, in 
recent years blast has become more and more commonly considered in design (Security 
Management Consulting 201 0). 
Blast was rarely considered in building design (Carey and Myers 2009) prior to 
the Oklahoma City bombing. Shortly after the bombing on April 19, 2005 the General 
Services Administration published a Security Design Criteria which was a major step in 
preventing another event like the Oklahoma City Bombing. The Security Design Criteria 
have been updated a few times since its inception and typically recommends some type of 
barrier be constructed outside the building to create a standoff distance (Security 
Management Consulting 2010). After the terrorist attacks of9/11/2001, Jersey barriers 
were placed around many of the American Federal Buildings, which created an eyesore 
and a restrictive environment in many urban areas (Hill2004). Barriers reduce possible 
damage from explosive events by increasing the standoff distance, but when the desired 
standoff distance is 30 m (1 00 feet) it is sometimes impossible to achieve in urban 
environments (Nadel 2002). 
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Barriers are designed against certain breaches, but if one should occur, like what 
happened during 9/11/2001 terrorist attacks, many of the current federal buildings are at 
risk of collapse. This does not mean that there is a need to design all federal buildings for 
the use of airplanes as weapons, but it means that consideration should be given to the 
ability of our enemies to breach a barrier and then detonate an explosive. New federal 
buildings are designed to resist progressive collapse; however, it is difficult to retrofit an 
existing building to resist progressive collapse (Gonchar 2002). One method is to contain 
the blast within the exterior shell, which is investigated in this study. This study examines 
using two materials that may have applications as retrofit or new construction material. 
1.2 PURPOSE AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
This research study is the fourth phase of a multi-organizational effort to mitigate 
blast damage and harden structural systems. The project was undertaken under the 
Awareness and Localization of Explosive Related Threats (ALERT) center of excellence 
at Northeastern University. The study was funded by the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS). Personnel from the Department of Civil, Architectural, and 
Environmental Engineering (CArEE) and the Rock Mechanics and Explosives Research 
Center (RMERC) at Missouri University of Science and Technology (Missouri S&T) 
were engaged in the effort. 
This study examined the use of a high-volume fly ash-wood fiber (FA-WF) 
material as a sacrificial material with and without other hybrid technologies for blast 
mitigation and dissipation. A study by Tinsley and Myers (2007) has already been 
completed on the benefits ofF A-WF for blast mitigation. The study done by Tinsley and 
3 
Myers (2007) at Missouri S&T concluded that the FA-WF material provided a dramatic 
benefit in blast mitigation. The FA-WF material is a low strength and low density 
material that is highly ductile thus allowing for greater energy absorption (Tinsley and 
Myers 2007). The research presented in this study was aimed at investigating the benefits 
of a FA-WF layer, but also examined the benefits of a polyurea compound on a concrete 
panel with a FA-WF layer and the use ofintemal steel fibers in some hybrid systems. 
The benefits of plain polyurea during a blast event have already been well 
established through many previous studies and it is even being used currently by the 
United States (U.S.) Military (Applied Research Associates, Inc. 2004). So this study 
investigates using an e-glass, discrete fiber reinforced polyurea (DFRP). E-glass is 
electrically conductive glass. In a previous study done by Greene and Myers (2010) this 
same polyurea material with discrete e-glass fiber was investigated for its effects in 
strengthening existing structural members. In Greene's study, she indicated that the e-
glass DFRP exhibited strengthening qualities for flexure and shear. The discrete e-glass 
fiber material was studied to investigate its feasibility as a multi-functional retrofitting 
material. The e-glass DFRP could be a material that could be used to not only harden 
against blast, but also strengthen deteriorating or obsolete structures. This research 
attempts to discover if the added e-glass fiber contributes to the stiffness of a panel while 
also containing any fragments from a blast for various hybrid systems. 
The high volume fly ash-wood fiber (FA-WF) material was chosen for 
examination as a sacrificial material since it is a low strength yet ductile material. It was 
also chosen since both the wood fiber and the fly ash are byproducts of two industries: 
the lumber and coal power industries, respectively. This makes the material not only 
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beneficial in terms of properties but also in terms of a renewable and sustainability 
perspective. The FA-WF material was intended to be used as a sacrificial material on the 
compression face of steel fiber reinforced concrete (SFRC) base. A recently completed 
study by Carey compared SFRC and reinforced concrete (RC) and found that the SFRC is 
significantly better at containing. This study decided to use SFRC in almost all the panels 
to better understand the benefits of SFRC in combination with e-glass DFRP coatings and 
sacrificial FA-WF layers. 
The focus of this overall research study was on the combination of FA-WF, 
SFRC, and DFRP coatings. This study examined the benefits from the FA-WF and 
polyurea. The SFRC was not investigated for its benefits in this study since that study 
was undertaken by Carey and Myers (2012). 
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2. RELATED WORK 
Summaries of several studies and available literature in the fields of FA-WF, 
polyurea coatings, and blast mitigation testing are presented in this section. These 
research projects provided the foundation for this study. 
2.1 EXPLOSIVES 
The wave from a high explosive decays with distance and time as it propagates 
through the air. Equations 2.1 - 2.2 were used to account for the impact of distance on 
the decay in the wave, and calculate the initial overpressure (Ps+) in bar given a scaled 
distance (Z) in m away from a trinitrotoluene (TNT) charge. Equation 2.1 only applies to 
Ps+ values that are greater than or equal to 10 bar and Eq. 2.2 accounts for P/ values 
between 0.1 and 1 0 bar. The scaled distance, which was calculated using Eq. 2.3, 
accounted for the distance to the explosive (R) (i.e. standoff distance) in m and weight 
(W) in kg of the TNT charge (Chock and Kapania 2001 ). Explosive materials release a 
certain amount of energy based on the chemical composition of the material and weight 
allowing any explosive to be converted to a weight of TNT called a TNT equivalent, and 
for C-4 the TNT equivalent is 1.3 (National Counterterroism Center 20 II). Equations 
2.1 - 2.3 assume that the explosive is TNT, so the TNT equivalence of an explosive 
allowed these equations to be used. Once the peak overpressure was found at a specific 
location the decay in time was represented by Eq. 2.4 or the modified Friedlander's 
equation (Chock and Kapania 2001 ), which is illustrated in Figure 2.1. The modified 
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Friedlander's equation calculates pressure (p(t)) given a duration of time (t), atmospheric 
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Figure 2.1- Modified Friedlander's Equation 
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As a blast wave travels from one medium into the next medium the way it is 
transmitted into that medium is based on the shock wave impedance of the two materials. 
The shock wave impedance is based on the density of a material and the material's shock 
velocity. As a blast wave transitions from a lower shock impedance medium into a higher 
shock impedance medium, the wave is transmitted as a compression wave. If the wave is 
going from a higher to lower shock impedance the wave is transmitted as rarefaction or 
as a tensile wave if the medium is a solid. The greater the shock impedance mismatch is, 
the greater the amount of wave that is reflected, thus decreasing the amount of wave 
transmitted (Cooper 1996). 
2.2 DEVELOPMENT OF A FA-WF MATERIAL 
Society has encouraged many industries to adapt and attempt to recycle and reuse 
products to become more environmentally friendly. Concrete and construction industries 
have been in search of more environmentally friendly products and practices. This has led 
to looking at the waste products of other industries as possible sources of construction 
materials. 
Fly ash, which is now commonly used in concrete, is a byproduct of the coal 
power industry. Fly ash was first studied for use in concrete as a pozzolan in 1937 
(Halstead 1986), so its use in concrete is nothing new, but usage has been steadily 
increasing from 2000 to 2010 (American Coal Ash Association 2012). Fly ash presents 
itself as a substitute for a certain portion of the cement in concrete due to its pozzolanic 
properties, which allow it to increase long-term strength, chemical resistivity, and 
durability. Fly ash's spherical shape also allows it to improve the workability of concrete 
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(American Coal Ash Association 2003). Although usage has increased there is still a 
significant amount going to waste-62% (American Coal Ash Association 20 12). So the 
need for increasing the usage of fly ash is still present and this project investigates using 
fly ash as a major component of the sacrificial FA-WF blast material. 
The use of wood fiber in concrete is at least 70 years old (Durisol Building 
Systems, Inc. 2011) thus it is not a new technology either. The study of wood fiber 
concrete however, is somewhat limited. A few studies have been conducted regarding the 
durability of wood fiber concrete, including one by Coatanlem et al. (2006) which tested 
the effect of soaking the wood chips with a solution of sodium silicate on bond strength 
between the wood fibers and cementitous material. Coatanlem research found that the 
sodium silicate did in fact improve the bond strength and the material was able to 
maintain strength even after 16 months of exposure to harsh environments (Coatanlem, 
Jauberthie and Rendell 2006). In studies performed by Durisol Building Systems, Inc. it 
was discovered that the wood fiber concrete-insulated concrete forms they produce have 
fire rating of 4 hours and were resistant to termites despite being made of wood fibers 
(Durisol Building Systems, Inc. 2006). 
Combining fly ash in high volumes with wood fibers for use as a construction 
material has barely been researched. This is partly because the FA-WF material has been 
under development at Missouri S&T since a project by Joshi and Myers in 2005. The 
study performed by Joshi and Myers examined FA-WF for use as a construction material 
in walls. The study investigated the mechanical properties including strength, ductility, 
freeze-thaw, and shrinkage. Joshi found that the material provided some benefits such as 
sound resistance, ductile behavior, thermal resistance, and damping capability. Due to the 
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materials ductile behavior Joshi recommended that future studies investigate using this 
material in blast mitigation (Joshi and Myers 2005). 
2.3 FA-WF LAYER FOR BLAST MITIGATION 
Based on the recommendation by Joshi and Myers three later studies examined 
the blast resistance of FA-WF, including this one. The second phase of a project by 
Tinsley and Myers was the first to investigate FA-WF's performance during blast events. 
The test matrices for the two phases of the blast research are recorded in Tables 2.1- 2.2. 
The tables also outline the materials present in the 1180 x 1180 mm (46.5 x 46.5 in) 
panels, which all had a 90. mm (3.5 in) base. The hi-layered panels had an additional 50 
mm (2 in) high volume FA-WF blast mitigation material (BMM) layer (Tinsley and 
Myers 2007). 
The panels were tested at the University of Missouri-Rolla experimental mine 
with varying weights of an RDX-based C-4 explosive at varying standoff distances. Two 
to four blast events were used for each panel and are detailed in Tables 2.1- 2.2. The test 
set up is illustrated in Figure 2.2 (Tinsley and Myers 2007). 
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Table 2.1 -Tinsley's Phase 1 Test Matrix 
Charge Standoff 
Panel No. Event No. weight (g) distance (rrnn) Description 
1 454 915 Bi-layered construction with concrete base 
PanellA 2 680 610 and top layer ofBMM 0.2% reinforcement 
3 907 305 ratio in concrete and 0.16% in BMM layer 
4 1360 305 [140 rrnn (5.5 in) thick] 
1 225 915 High vohnne fly ash-wood fiber blast 
Panel2A 2 454 915 mitigation material with reinforcement ratio 
3 680 610 of0.2% in each direction [89 mm (3 .5 in) 
4 907 305 thick] 
1 454 915 Normal-weight concrete with addition of 
Panel3A 6% wood fibers by weight with 0.2% 2 680 610 reinforcement ratio in each direction [89 mm 
3 907 305 (3.5 in) thick] 
1 454 910 Normal-weight concrete with 0.5% 
Panel4A 2 1134 305 reinforcement ratio in each direction [89 rrnn 
3 1360 152 (3.5 in) thick] 
1 454 915 Bi-layered construction with 0.5% 
2 1134 305 Panel5A 
3 1360 305 
reinforced concrete base and top layer 
4 1360 Contact 
BMM [140 mm (5.5 in) thick] 
Mine Boun ary 






Figure 2.2 -Blast Test Setup (Tinsley and Myers 2007) 
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Table 2.2 - Tinsley's Phase 2 Test Matrix 
Charge Standoff 
Panel No. Event No. weight (J!;) distance (rrnn) Description 
1 680 610 Bi-layered construction with concrete 
2 907 305 base and top layer ofBMM 0.2% 
Panel1B reinforcement ratio in concrete and 
3 1360 305 0.16% in BMM layer coated with 
4 1360 152 polyurea 
1 680 610 High volmne fly ash-wood fiber blast 
Panel2B 
mitigation material with reinforcement 
ratio of0.2% each direction. Coated 
2 907 305 
with polyurea 
1 680 610 Normal-weight concrete with addition of 
Panel3B 2 907 305 
6% wood fibers by weight with 0.2% 
reinforcement ratio in each direction. 
3 1360 152 Coated with polyurea 
1 680 610 Normal-weight concrete with 0.5% 
Panel4B 2 1134 305 reinforcement ratio in each direction 
3 1360 152 Coated with polyurea 
1 680 610 F A-C-WF panel and RC panel 
Panel5B 2 907 305 seperated by 19 rrnn (0. 75 in) air gap. 
3 1360 305 Reinforcement ratio of each Panel was 
4 1360 152 0.2% 
Tinsley tested each panel until a failure was noticed. He then compared the panels 
based on the blast loading each panel absorbed prior to failure and by comparing the 
damage caused by the common 0.68 kg ( 1.5 lb) charge at a standoff distance of 610 mm 
(24 in) shared by all but two panels. From his comparisons he concluded that the FA-WF 
material was beneficial when used in a hi-layered setup as a sacrificial layer, but that the 
FA-WF material was not as effective as reinforced concrete when used individually at 
mitigating blast damage. 
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Following Tinsley's work, a project conducted by Carey and Myers (2009) 
examined the use of FA-WF and polyurea in blast barriers. The project investigated six 
barriers which are described in the test matrix, Table 2.3. This project was on larger scale 
blast testing than Tinsley and Myers (2007) project. In the work done by Carey and 
Myers (2009) the barrier size was 3.3 x 0.61 x 1.07 m (130 x 24 x 42 in). The testing for 
this project was done at the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) at Tyndall Air Force 
Base in Florida. 
Table 2.3 - Carey's Barrier Test Matrix 
Barrier No. Description 
Standard reinfOrced concrete barrier (external coating system: polyurea 
Barrier #1 and chopped glass fibers 
Barrier #2 Standard ReinfOrced concrete barrier (external coating system: polyurea) 
Hybrid construction, concrete barrier with a layer ofWF -FA (external 
Barrier #3 coating system: polyurea) 
Hybrid construction, concrete barrier with a layer ofWF-FA (external 
Barrier #4 coating system: polyurea and chopped glass fibers) 
Barrier #5 Hybrid construction, concrete barrier with a layer ofWF-FA 
Barrier #6 Standard reinfOrced concrete barrier 
The tested panel was placed in a chain of support barriers and an undisclosed 
charge was placed on the front face of the panel. A standard video was taken from the 
same side of the barrier as the where the charge was placed while a high speed video was 
taken from the other side of the barrier. A pressure gauge was placed 15 m from the 
center; the entire setup illustrated in Figure 2.3. The visual surface area damage, mass 
loss and debris scatter were all recorded to compare the barrier systems. 
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Pressure Guage 
cf Charge Test Barrier 
High Speed Camera 
~ 
Figure 2.3- Blast Test Setup 
Carey concluded from her results that the polyurea significantly reduced the 
damage in all the categories investigated. Another finding was that the FA-WF's only 
positive benefit was a reduced scatter only in the uncoated panels. Overall barrier #2, the 
standard reinforced concrete barrier with plain polyurea, performed the best considering 
the three parameters recorded (Carey and Myers 2009). 
2.4 DEVELOPMENT OF A DISCRETE FIBER REINFORCED POL YUREA 
Polyurea is formed by the chemical reaction between an isocyanate and an amine-
terminated resin blend (Polyurea Development Association 2010). An isocyanate is a 
chain of nitrogen, carbon and oxygen with an overall negative one imbalance of electrons 
(-NCO) (Occupational Safety & Health Administration 2008). An amine is a basic 
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orgamc compound containing Nitrogen (Hyper Physics 201 0). Polyurea has been 
investigated since the 1990s for its use in design and retrofit of blast resistant elements. 
Much of the research done on polyurea was funded by the military and thus not readily 
available in the public domain. Some military vehicles use polyurea coatings because it 
provides a higher level of protection per weight than rolled homogeneous armor, which 
was traditionally used for blast protection. As of 2004, 96 high mobility multipurpose 
vehicle doors have been retrofitted with polyurea. The ease of application, ability to 
absorb some of the blast, and ability to contain fragmentation has made the polyurea an 
ideal product for use in military vehicles (Applied Research Associates, Inc. 2004). 
Research done by Davidson et al in 2004 investigated using polyurea on masonry 
walls. Davidson built dual wall sections at the AFRL at TAFB and then applied the 
polyurea to one wall. He then detonated a charge outside the structure and then analyzed 
the results. Figure 2.4 illustrates post-event behavior after one of the events. The section 
of the wall on the right side in Figure 2.4 was coated with polyurea, while the wall 
section on the left that was reduced to rubble was not coated with polyurea. Davidson 
found that the polyurea was very effective at strengthening a masonry wall against blast 
(Davidson, et at. 2004 ). 
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Figure 2.4- External Test 1 Results. (Davidson, et al. 2004) 
LINE-X the same company that provided material for this investigation currently 
uses a product called PAX CON 3350 in U.S. military buildings (LINE-X Protective 
Coatings Corp. 2004). Some of the structures that have been coated with PAX CON 3350 
for blast protection are the U.S. Pentagon, the Federal Courthouse in New York and the 
Washington Naval Base. The material was also used in over 50,000 armor plates worn by 
soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan, and has even saved at least one life (PAXCON 2011 ). 
Polyurea has been proven as an effective blast resistant material. Researchers at 
Missouri S&T have been investigating combining polyurea in a discrete fashion with e-
glass fiber to create an easily applied, multi-hazard, retrofit material. The research 
undertaken by Carey and Myers (2009) was the first to investigate this e-glass DFRP 
material. The results from this research showed no significant impact in reducing 
fragmentation, with low fiber ratios from adding the e-glass fibers (Carey and Myers 
2009). These results lead to the effort to develop and characterize various e-glass DFRP 
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systems that may perform better in blast resistance and act as a possible strengthening 
agent. In a subsequent project by Carey and Myers (20 1 0) five types of polyurea were 
examined under direct tension testing. This study also investigated the addition of 
discrete E-glass fibers, which included determining an optimal fiber length and fiber 
ratio. The test matrix for this study is reported in Table 2.4. The length of glass fiber was 
controlled by setting the spacing of the blades in the chop gun. The percentage of fiber 
was regulated by the fiber feed rate (i.e. number of turns applied to a dial on the spray 
gun). 
Table 2.4 - Test Matrix 
Material Fiber Length, nun (in) Fiber Chopping Speed(# ofdia1 turns) 
Polyurea A 6 (0.25) 3, 3.5, 3.75, 4, 5 
Polyurea A 13 (0.5) 3, 3.5, 3.75, 4 
Po1yurea A 38 (1.5) 3, 3.5, 3.75 
Polyurea B 6 (0.25) 3,4,5,6,7,9 
Polyurea C 6 (0.25) 3,4,5,6,7,8 
Polyurea D 6 (0.25) 3,4,5,6,7,8 
Polyurea E 6 (0.25) 3,4,5,6,7,8 
The first set of specimens created and tested were the three sets of different fiber 
length polyurea a specimens. These were tested and analyzed prior to making any other 
specimens to determine optimal fiber length. From this testing series it was determined 
that a fiber length of 6.4 mm (0.25 in) was optimal for the E-glass fiber used. The longer 
fiber length increased the ability for fiber rupture, but dramatically decreased the ultimate 
strain at failure. Subsequent studies focused on the integration of 6.4 mm (0.25 in) fibers. 
The tensile strength and fiber ratio were then found for each specimen. From this data 
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Carey concluded that Polyurea B and E should be further investigated. Figures 2.5 - 2.6 
are graphs of the stress versus strain for Polyurea B and E respectively. Polyurea B was 
chosen because of its higher yield strength while Polyurea E was chosen because of its 
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The next phase of research on e-glass DFRP was undertaken by Greene and 
Myers (2010). Polyurea B and E from Carey's work were used in Greene's study and 
were termed as Polyurea A and B, respectively (Polyurea B now is Polyurea A, and 
Polyurea E now is Polyurea B). Greene investigated the use of e-glass DFRP as a 
strengthening agent for columns and beams. She used three different strength concrete 
mixes to create cylinders that were then sprayed with the polyurea to investigate if the 
polyurea provides any strength gains from confinement. The results indicated that the 
both polyurea A & = had minimal impact on strength and modulus of elasticity. 
Another part of her research was on DFRP strengthened beams, for this phase full 
scale beams were fabricated and tested until failure. Polyurea A did not provide any 
strength gains for the beams, but the polyurea B systems provided additional flexural 
19 
strength, increased residual deflections, and improved shear strength. This disparity 
between the two polyurea materials was attributed to the set times. Polyurea A has a 3-6 
second gel time while polyurea B has an 11-13 second gel time. This additional gel time 
allowed the fibers to more easily mix or assimilate into the polyurea (Greene and Myers 
201 0). The results from Greene's study indicate that the e-glass DFRP provided 
additional flexural strength which could be beneficial in multi-hazard mitigation. 
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3. EXPERIMENTAL PROGRAM 
3.1 SPECIMEN FABRICATION AND TEST SETUP 
A total of thirteen panels were fabricated in the Missouri S&T Structural 
Engineering High Bay Research Laboratory (SERL). Table 3.1 shows the test matrix 
used for this experiment. All the panels consisted of a combination of some of the 
following: steel fiber reinforced concrete (SFRC), plain reinforced concrete (RC), high-
volume fly ash-wood fiber (FA-WF), and a polyurea compound. These composites were 
investigated based on previous work by Tinsley and Myers (2007) and Carey and Myers 
(2009). The SFRC acted as the base material in most of the panels and the FA-WF 
material was designed to perform as a sacrificial layer during the blast. The polyurea 
layer was designed to primarily contain any spalling or fragmentation. 
Table 3.1 - Experimental Test Matrix 
PanelNa~re 
Polyurea 
FA-WF Layer Control XSlOO Fiber XSlOO XS430 Fiber XS430 
None SFRC-3.5 SFRC-5.5 1-RC 2-RC 
50rrm 1-H 2-H H-A H-AlF H-B H-B/F 
50 rrm +Foam Gap H-FG H-FG-A/F H-FG-B/F 
All the panels were 1180 x 1180 mm ( 46.5 x 46.5 in) with varymg depths, 
between 90. mm (3.5 in) and 220 mm (8.5 in). Drawing of the profiles of the panels can 
be found in Appendix A. The nomenclature for the panel names in Table 3.1 were based 
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on the materials that comprised the panels. For the SFRC and RC panels the ID notations 
indicate the only material that comprised the panel. For panels with a number prior to the 
name it indicates that there were more than one panel of the same configuration and the 
numbering is just differentiating the panels. Panels with a number after indicate that the 
depth in inches of that panel. The hybrid panels consisting of a base SFRC layer and FA-
WF layer use the designation of H. The panels incorporating a foam-gap use H-FG to 
describe a hybrid panel (H) with a foam-gap (FG). The polyurea's appellation of A for 
XS 100 and B for XS430 is consistent with the study by Greene and Myers (20 l 0). The 
presence of discrete glass fibers in the polyurea layer is indicated by adding a /F to the 
polyurea type. For example, the H-FG-A/F panel consists of a steel fiber reinforced 
concrete base with a layer of high-volume fly ash-wood fiber separated by a foam-gap 
and coated with the XS I 00 polyurea combined with discrete glass fibers. 
3.1.1 Materials. The following materials were used in the construction of the test 
panels: Class C fly ash, type I Portland cement, wood fibers, polyurea, E-glass fibers, 
steel fibers, mild steel reinforcement, coarse aggregate and fine aggregate. 
The ASTM Class C fly ash (ASTM C618-08a 2008) was donated by Labadie 
Power Plant of St. Louis, Missouri. The fly ash was a key ingredient in the FA-WF 
material. The chemical composition of the fly ash is reported in Table 3.2 (Ameren 
Corporation 2011). Figure 3.1a displays the fly ash used in this project. 
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Table 3.2 - Chemical Compositions of Class C Fly Ash and Type I Portland Cement 
Labadie Class C Monarch Type I 
Colllponent Fly Ash(%) Portland Cement(%) 
Silicon Dioxide (Si0 2 ) 33.46 21.80 
Ahuninurn Oxide (Al2 0 3) 19.53 4.56 
Ferric Oxide (Fe2 0 3) 6.28 3.46 
Calcitun Oxide (CaO) 26.28 63.28 
Magnesitun Oxide (MgO) 5.54 2.04 
Sul:firr Trioxide (S03) 2.40 2.65 
Loss ofignition 0.34 0.53 
Mositure 0.15 -
Potassitun Oxide (K2 0) 0.45 0.55 
Phosphon.IS Pentoxide (P2 0 5 ) 1.30 -
Titanitun Dioxide (TiO 2 ) 1.48 -
Soditun Oxide (Na2 0) 1.73 0.18 
Manganic Oxide (Mn2 03) 0.04 -
Zinc Oxide (ZnO) 0.02 -
Chromium Oxide (CrO) 0.01 -
Barimn Oxide (BaO) 0.84 -
Strontitun Oxide (SrO) 0.40 -
Insoluble Residue - 0.26 
Monarch type I Portland cement (ASTM C150/C150M-11 2011) was purchased 
from a local contractor supplier. Portland cement was a key ingredient in the sacrificial 
FA-WF layer. The chemical composition for the cement (The Monarch Cement Company 
2011) is reported in Table 3.2 along with the fly ash. Figure 3.1b displays the cement 
used in this project. 
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(a) Class C Fly Ash (b) Type I Portland Cement 
Figure 3.1 - Cementitious Materials 
The milled oak wood fibers were donated by Encore Building Solutions of St. 
Louis (EBS) and are milled from recycled wood pallets. The typical size of the wood 
fibers was 6.4 to 13 mm (0.25 to 0.50 in) with some very fine particles but few particles 
longer than 13 mm (0.50 in). Table 3.3 presents the mechanical properties of the milled 
oak wood fibers and Figure 3.2 displays a sample of the wood fibers. 
Table 3.3 - Mechanical Properties of Oak 








Figure 3.2 - Wood Fibers 
The polyurea was purchased and applied by LINE-X of Columbia, MO. The 
polyurea is typically used as a commercial grade spray-on bed liner for vehicles and 
contain zero volatile organic compounds (VOC). Two different polyureas were used: XS-
100 (Polyurea A) and XS-430 (Polyurea B). The XS-100 is LINE-X's base material is 
typically used as a bed liner and is rapid setting. The XS-430 is a higher grade, slower set 
material. Material properties for the LINE-X products used are reported in Table 3.4 
(Greene and Myers 2010). Figure 3.3a displays a plain polyurea B coupon specimen. 
Table 3.4 - Polyurea Material Properties 
Polyurea Des~tion 
Mechanical Properties A B 
Density (kglrn3 ) 928 878 
Elongation (%)-AS1M D412-06a 91 445 
Tensile Strength (Mpa)-AS1M D412-06a 14.8 19.3 
Gel Time (sec) 3-6 11-13 
Tack Free Time (sec) 6-9 78-85 
.J_ .J 
-Untt Conversions. 1.00 kg/m -0.0624lb/ft, 1.00 MPa-145 psi 
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The E-glass fiber was procured from Owens Corning. This material was 
combined with the polyurea to create the DFRP by using a chopper attachment on the 
polyurea spray gun. The chopper attachment runs on compressed air and is similar to 
what is found in fiberglass installation. The speed of the chopper was adjustable as was 
the length of the fibers. Based on the recommendations of earlier work performed at 
Missouri S&T 6.4 mm (0.25 in) fibers were used (Carey and Myers 201 0). The 
mechanical properties of the e-glass presented in Table 3.5 were provided by the 
manufacturer. An image from the Owens Coming's website shows what the chopped 
fibers looked like after processing (Figure 3.3b ). An e-glass DFRP B bum off specimen 
is illustrated in Figure 3.3c. 
Table 3.5 - Glass Fiber Material Properties 
Mechanical Properties Dry Range 
Tensile Strength (Mpa)-ASTM D638-1 0 59-98 
Tensile Modulus (Mpa)-ASTM D638-10 7542-14893 
Flexural Strength (Mpa)-ASTM D790-1 0 166-307 
Flexural Modulus (Mpa)-ASTM D790-1 0 6939-12065 
Unit Conversion: 1.00 MPa=l45 psi 
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(a) Plain Polyurea B (b) Chopped Glass Fibers (Owens Coming 2012) 
(c) Polyurea B with Discrete £-glass Fibers 
Figure 3.3 - Polyurea and E-glass 
The steel fiber was procured from Propex. Their product Novocon 1050HE was 
recommended by the manufacturer for blast resistance. This material was used in the 
construction of the base for most of the panels. The steel fiber has also been used in a 
concurrent project by Carey and Myers. Steel fibers have been proven to improve the 
flexural performance and toughness of concrete, so based on this and the good results 
from Carey's work it was selected for this phase of study. Figure 3.4 shows a sample of 
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the steel fibers while Table 3.6 displays the fiber properties provided by the manufacturer 
(Propex Concrete Systems 2007). 
Table 3.6 - Steel Fiber Properties 
Property 1050HE 
Fiber Length (nnn) 50 
Diameter (mm) 1 
Tensile Strength (Mpa) 1050 
Unit Conversions: 1.00 mm=0.0394 in 1.00 MPa=145 psi 
Figure 3.4 - Propex Novocon 1050H Steel Fiber 
Steel reinforcement was purchased from Nu-Way Construction in Jefferson City, 
MO. ASTM number 3 bars (ASTM A615/A615M-09b 2009) were used as longitudinal 
reinforcement and 6.0 mm (0.25 in) cold rolled round bars were used for stirrups in the 
hi-layered systems. The 10. mm (0.38 in) rebar was tested according to ASTM 
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A370/A370M-lla for quality assurance using the Tinius Olsen to have an actual yield 
strength of441.2 MPa (64.0 ksi) at a 0.5 percent offset and an ultimate strength of712.5 
MPa (103.3 ksi). 
The concrete was supplied by Rolla Ready Mix, in Rolla, MO. A 25 mm (1.0 in) 
nominal maximum size aggregate, 27.5 MPa (4000 psi) mix was used in combination 
with the steel fibers to construct all the bases of the panels. This basic mix design was 
consistent with concurrent project by Carey and Myers and also with the project 
performed by Tinsley and Myers in 2007 to provide comparable bench marking. 
3.1.2 Test Specimen Fabrication. The panels were fabricated usmg oiled 
wooden forms. Two forms from a previous project, Tinsley and Myers 2007, along with 
two additional forms, constructed for this project were used to fabricate the panels. The 
new forms had removable side walls to allow for changeable depths, which was 
important for fabrication of the hybrid panels. The adjustable walls allowed the forms to 
be flush with the concrete layer and then could be raised for the placing of the FA-WF 
layer on top. The two forms from the existing project had permanently attached side 
walls with one having a depth of90. mm (3.5 in) and the other having a depth of 140 mm 
(5.5 in). All the forms were constructed to fabricate an 1180 x 1180 mm ( 46.5 x 46.5 in) 
panels and either had adjustable depth or was fixed at 90. mm (3.5 in) or 140 mm (5.5 in). 
Annotated drawings of panel dimensions are displayed in Appendix A. A few days prior 
to the placement of the concrete the forms were cleaned and adjusted if necessary. For the 
placement of the concrete layer all the forms were adjusted or marked for a 90. mm (3.5 
in) depth. On the day before concrete placement the forms were coated in bar chain oil 
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and set out in the Missouri S&T SERL on top of a large amount of plastic sheeting. On 
the day of the placement bar chain oil was again amply applied to the forms prior to 
concrete placement to allow the panels to be lifted out of the forms. The first coat of oil 
allows the wood to absorb the oil so that the second coat will not be absorbed and thus 
allow for ease in stripping the forms. 
All the panels also had the same longitudinal reinforcing steel layout, which is 
illustrated in Figure 3.5 and an annotated drawing of the rebar layout is displayed in 
Appendix A. Seven number 3 ASTM grade 60 mild steel bars extended in both 
directions providing a reinforcement ratio of 0.5% for the typical depth panels. The 
reinforcement ratio and layout was based on the results and recommendations of Tinsley 
and Myers (2007) study. The SFRC-5.5 had the same reinforcement layout which 
provided a reinforcement ratio of 0.32%. The clear cover from the sides and the extreme 
tension fiber was 25 mm (1.0 in) based on the nominal maximum aggregate size. To 
create the clear cover steel running chairs were used. Panels that included the FA-WF 
layer also had two 6.4 mm (0.25 in) cold rolled round bars used as stirrups and to connect 
the two layers. The stirrups were cut into 3 m (1 0 ft) lengths and then bent. All the 
reinforcement was delivered in 6 m (20 ft) lengths and the longitudinal reinforcement 
was cut to lengths of around 1130 mm ( 44.5 in). They were then placed into a tying table 
that was constructed for this project and is illustrated in Figure 3.6. The steel was then 
tied with tie wire and a manual twister tool. This was all done days before a scheduled 
concrete placement. Then on the day of the placement, chairs and stirrups were tied to the 
cages and then the assembly was set into the oiled forms. 
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Figure 3.5 - Reinforcing Steel Layout in Forms 
Figure 3.6 - Tying Table 
The steel fiber reinforced concrete base layer (i.e. structural concrete) was placed 
first. The panels were placed in the Missouri S&T SERL. A concrete rotary truck was 
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ordered for the placement of concrete. Once the truck arrived, the slump was measured 
and water was added until the slump satisfied the target slump of 130 mm (5.0 in). The 
steel was then added to the truck at a ratio of 65 kg per every cubic meter ( 11 0 lb per 1 
yd3) of concrete, this ratio was selected based upon previous work and recommendations 
by the manufacturer. The steel fiber was added gradually to the truck and after all the 
fiber was added, the drum was spun at high speed for five minutes. The concrete was then 
poured from the truck to the panels to the desired depth, typically 90. mm (3.5 in), and 
then vibrated and leveled with a screed. A wood board, screed, was slowly pushed across 
the concrete until a level surface was obtained. For the hybrid panels the concrete was not 
smooth finished, but instead the finish was just enough to get a fairly even depth 
throughout while remaining rough on the surface. A trowel was used to finish the panels 
and after finishing, hooks made from number 3 ASTM bars and the 6.4 mm (0.25 in) 
stirrups were placed by hand into the panel. Figure 3. 7 illustrates the SFRC placing 
process. The panels were allowed to cure for at least two days before they were stripped 
or the sacrificial FA-WF layers were added. 
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(a) Pouring ofSFRC (b) Vibrating the Concrete 
(c) Leveling with Screed (d) Placing the Stirrups 
Figure 3. 7 - Concrete Placing 
Two different configurations ofF A-WF were investigated: a 50 mm (2 in) layer 
fabricated on top of the structural concrete layer and a 50 mm (2 in) sacrificial FA-WF 
layer with a 76 mm (3.0 in) gap, referred to as a foam-gap, was filled with Styrofoam 
insulated sheeting separating the two layers. The foam-gap represents a foam-gap and 
was used for ease of construction and with the expectation that the Styrofoam insulated 
sheeting may absorb some of the blast and limit the damage in the SFRC layer. For the 
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panels with the FA-WF layer placed directly on the structural concrete layer the total 
depth was 140 mm (5.5 in) and the panels with the foam-gap have a total depth of 220 
mm (8.5 in). 
The high-volume fly ash-wood fiber layer was hatched in a conventional rotary 
drum mixer in the Missouri S&T Construction Material's Laboratory. Table 3.7 shows 
the mix proportions for the FA-WF layer. The units in Table 3.7 refer to the mass or 
weight by final volume. For example kg/m3 means however many kilograms of that 
material dictated in the table per cubic meter of concrete. Due to the 0.17 m 3 (6 fe) 
capacity of the mixer, the FA-WF layer for one panel was done at a time. The hatching 
process started with adding the majority of the water and then adding all of the wood 
fiber. The drum was spun slowly at this point and then the fly ash was added gradually 
ensuring no clumping was occurring. After all the fly ash was added the Portland cement 
was added gradually. The minimal level of water that was initially withheld was added at 
the end to improve the mixing process. The mix was watched carefully to ensure no 
balling occurred. If there was balling the balls were broken up by hand. The drum was 
watched and spun for about 5 minutes after all the materials were added to ensure 
consolidation. 
Table 3.7- FA-WF Mix Design 
kgt7m3 lb/yd3 
Class C fly ash 610.5 1043.955 
Portland Cement 367.5 628.425 
Wood Fibers 150 256.5 
Water 372 636.12 
Units are in weight per volume of expected batch 
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The drum was then emptied into a wheelbarrow and wheeled into the Missouri 
S&T SERL. The wheelbarrow was then dumped out on top ofthe panel. The FA-WF was 
then spread evenly using a trowel. The mixture was not vibrated due to its low 
workability; instead the sides of the forms were tapped using a rubber mallet. The panel 
was then smooth-finished with the trowel and then allowed to cure for at least one day 
before the forms were stripped. 
The panels were given at least two weeks to cure under laboratory conditions. 
After this amount of time the panels were transported to LINE-X in Columbia, MO to 
coat the panels with the polyurea systems. Four different configurations of polyurea were 
used: Plain polyurea A (A), polyurea A with glass fibers (A/F), plain polyurea B (B), and 
polyurea B with glass fibers (B/F). Prior to spraying the panels, the surface was ground 
using a hand grinder or sand blaster. The grinding created a rough surface for the 
polyurea to adhere to. The next step was to apply a primer to the panels, which required 
at least 8 hours but no more than 12 hours to set. The primer was applied to enhance the 
bond performance of the applied coating systems. After allowing the primer to set the 
polyurea was applied to the panels until a depth of 6.4 mm (0.25 in) was achieved. A 
trained professional handled coating the panels; Figure 3.8 illustrates the polyurea 
application. The glass fiber was added to the polyurea by attaching a Glasscraft chopper 
to the polyurea spray gun. The chopping mechanism operated on compressed air and 
blew the chopped pieces of fiber into the stream of polyurea. 
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Figure 3.8 - E-Glass DFRP B Application 
3.1.3 Blast Test Setup. For the blast testing, the Missouri S&T Experimental 
Mine was utilized. On their site they have an explosives testing mine, named the 
Wombat, which was used for this blast testing. The panels were placed in an alcove of the 
Wombat mine on top of two steel I -beams for support as illustrated in Figures 3.9a -
3.9b. Annotated drawings of the test setups are displayed in Appendix A. The FA-WF 
was facing upward and the polyurea layer, when present, was facing downward The 
typical setup for the foam-gap panels as shown in Figure 3.9b, with the supports for the 
foam-gap running along parallel to the steel supports, was used because this arrangement 
best represented a panel with a foam-gap that may be found in practice. 
Detonator Wire 
(a) Typical Setup for Hybrid Panels 
Detonator Wire 
(b) Typical Set up for Hybrid Panels with a Foam-Gap 
Figure 3.9 - Typical Blast Setups 
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The blast testing consisted of an initial blast at a standoff distance of 31 0 mm ( 12 
in) and then a second blast at a standoff of 150 mm (6.0 in). The first blast event had a 
37 
1.4 kg (3.0 lb) C4 charge at a 310 mm (12 in) standoff to remain consistent with the 
concurrent project by Carey and Myers (2012). Ideally one blast event would have been 
used; however, two blast events were selected because the first blast event resulted in 
minimal damage for the majority of the panels. The concern with using two blast events 
is that the second event tends to build upon the damage from the previous event making it 
difficult to distinguish the damage for each event and it is difficult to accurately 
determine what stress level caused the damage level exhibited; however, it was more 
important to this study that it remain consistent with the concurrent project by Carey and 
Myers (2012) so comparisons could easily be drawn between both studies. Therefore, a 
second event was used to achieve more significant and measurable damage. 
The estimated peak overpressures were calculated for both events using Eq. 2.1 
and 2.3. The calculated peak overpressure was 42 MPa (6100 psi) for the 310 mm (12 in) 
standoff and 340 MPa (49000 psi) for the 150 mm (6.0 in) standoff. 
Con WEP version 2.1.0.8 was used to model the blast pressures on the panels 
given the standoff distances, charge type and weight, and the surface geometry of the 
panels. Con WEP was not used to model the expected results of the panels but just the 
surface pressures exhibited on the panels. Con WEP output three dimensional graphs of 
the surface pressures, which are illustrated in Appendix B. ConWEP, calculated the 
predicted peak pressures to be 108 MPa (15700 psi) for the 310 mm (12 in) event and 
280 MPa (41000 psi) for the 150 mm (6.0 in) event. ConWEP also predicts the pressure 
and impulse time histories which are illustrated in Figures 3.10 - 3.11 for the 31 0 mm 
(12 in) and 150 mm (6.0 in) events, respectively. 
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The values and graph produced by Con WEP were considerably different than the 
values and graph calculated with the equations presented earlier. The output from 
Con WEP is considered a more accurate method of approximating blast pressures and 
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Figure 3.10 - ConWEP Pressure and Impulse Time Histories, 310 mm Standoff 
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Figure 3.11- ConWEP Pressure and Impulse Time Histories, 150 mm Standoff 
The experimental results in full scale blast testing are often subjective as it is 
often difficult to get quantitative results from blast testing. This difficulty is due to the 
damage a full scale blast event does to the test specimens, making using instrumentation 
costly and unreliable. This was also the case in this study; therefore, numerous 
photographs were taken prior to the first blast event, after the first blast event, and after 
the second blast event. These photographs were examined then conclusions were drawn 
from comparisons. For quantitative data, residual deflections were measured using a 
40 
straight edge laid across the panel to represent the original surface of the panel so the gap 
the straight edge and panel formed represented the residual deflection. A ruler was then 
used to measure the residual deflections or gap. This process is illustrated in Figure 3.12. 
The residual deflections were taken at the center of the panel and front and back edges of 
the panel. The residual deflections were taken prior to and after blasting. This proved 
somewhat difficult with the sacrificial FA-WF layer since it would occasionally break off 
during the blast event. 
Figure 3.12 - Measuring Residual Deflections 
Support for the blast testing was provided by personnel from the RMERC at 
Missouri S&T. The explosive used was 1.4 kg (3.0 lb) ofC4 with a lead azide primary to 
aid detonation for both blast events. The first blast was set up using copper MasterDet 
wires that hung down from the ceiling until a standoff distance of 310 mm (12 in) was 
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measured from the center of the panel. The standoff distances were measured from the 
surface of the panel to the center of the charge using a ruler. The MasterDet wires were 
then connected to a spool oflonger detonator wires that exited the Wombat mine and lead 
into a blasting machine. The blast was then detonated after allowing everyone to reach 
cover. After the blast 30 minutes to an hour was given during mine ventilation to allow 
any toxic chemicals that follow the blast to exit the Wombat mine. After the all clear was 
given images and residual deflections were taken inside the Wombat mine. After 
documentation, the panel was readjusted on the two 1-beams and the second blast event 
was set up in the same fashion with the standoff distance changed to 150 mm (6.0 in). 
After the second blast event the panel was removed from the Wombat mine and 
additional Images of the underside of the panels were documented. The tested panels 
were then set aside to be disposed of later. This process was repeated for each panel 
tested. 
3.2 MECHANICAL PROPERTIES 
Material properties are of great importance. Material properties allow for relating 
the results of this experiment to future work. They were also important because not all the 
panels could be cast at the same time so material properties were used to correlate the 
results from panels cast at different times. The material properties examined in this 
experiment for the concrete and FA-WF include compressive strength, modulus of 
rupture, modulus of elasticity, and material density. For the polyurea material the 
important properties were the tensile strength and the fiber ratio. 
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3.2.1 Compressive Strength. The compressive strength was determined using 
100 x 200 mm ( 4 x 8 in) cylinders, tested at 7, 14, and 28 days and on the test date. The 
cylinders were prepared in accordance with ASTM Cl92/C192M-07. The only deviation 
with the ASTM was the use of plastic single use molds for more than one use (ASTM 
C470/C470M-09 2009). To allow the plastic molds to be used multiple times the inside 
was lightly coated with bar chain oil and a small hole was punctured in the bottom so the 
cylinder could be extracted with pressurized air. The cylinders were made in two lifts 
with 25 rods and 25 exterior taps using a 6.4 mm (0.25 in) diameter tamping rod then 
finished with a trowel. Figure 3.13 illustrates the cylinders being made. The cylinders 
were prepared in the lab and then removed from the molds after at least 24 hours. They 
were then cured next to the panels in the laboratory until testing to match panel curing as 
closely as possible. 
Figure 3.13 - Wet Concrete in Cylinder Molds 
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To ensure parallel surfaces the SFRC cylinders were capped, at least one day prior 
to testing, using a sulfur Rediron 9000 Capping Compound in accordance to ASTM 
C617-11. The capping compound was melted in a 7.57 L (8 qt) Ritehete melting pot then 
ladled into a beveled plate. The cylinder was then immediately placed into the molten 
sulfur using an alignment device to center the cap. The cylinder was then removed after 
giving sufficient time to allow the cap to harden. 
The FA-WF cylinders were ground using a Marui & Co. concrete specimen end 
grinder to ensure parallel surfaces. The machine was set up for grinding 100 mm (4 in) 
cylinders by placing the proper screen in the machine. The machine requires water so the 
water to machine was turned on and the outflow hose was placed into the open drainage 
system in the material's lab. The machine has time and speed inputs that are set to grind 
the cylinder till you have a flush, fully ground cylinder while also limiting the damage to 
the grinder. To prevent damage to the grinder, the speed should correlate with the 
expected strength, the stronger the cylinder the slower the speed. The time input is based 
on the speed and amount of cylinder that must be ground. 
A set of three cylinders were tested in accordance to ASTM C39/C39M-11 at 
each test date. Prior to testing the diameter of the top and bottom of the cylinder were 
measured. Once the cylinders were measured the Forney LC-4 was set up for the 
cylinders by adding steel plates to the bottom platen, to avoid reaching the maximum 
platen height. The cylinders were then placed into the Forney and wrapped with a cloth 
for safety. The bottom platen moved and was controlled with a lever switch and throttle 
to control the loading rate. Initially the lever is set to full advance to quickly raise the 
bottom until a small load registered on the machine. The full advance can quickly 
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overload the cylinder causing a premature break in the cylinder so it was important to 
watch the cylinder and switch the full advance off immediately after a load was 
recognized. The lever switch was then set to metered advance and the throttle was used to 
adjust the loading rate. The target loading rate for a 100 mm ( 4 in) cylinder was 2.3 
kN/sec (560 lb/sec). All the cylinders were tested in the Forney LC-4 which has a 
capacity of2700 kN (600,000 lb) and is illustrated in Figure 3.14. 
Figure 3.14- Forney LC-4 
Table 3.8 contains a summary of the compressive strength data from the test date 
breaks by panel. The strength of some concrete was so low that additional cores were 
taken out of a panel that was not tested to verify panel compressive strength. The cores 
were drilled and prepared for testing according to ASTM C42/C42M-11 and then tested 
in accordance with ASTM C39/C39M-11. Since a 94 mm (3.7 in) core would not allow 
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for LID> 1 a 43 mm ( 1. 7 in) core was used instead. The target length to diameter ratio was 
2 which would result in no correction factor. The cores were drilled in the field and then 
placed into a bag and transported to the Construction Materials Laboratory, where the 
ends were sawed to provide parallel surfaces. One specimen required a significant piece 
be sawed off and thus had an L/D=1.6, which required a correction factor of 0.98. After 
the specimens were sawed they were placed back into the bag and the following day they 
were tested in the Forney LC-4. Measurements were taken of the diameter and length 
prior to testing. Table 3.9 contains the results of the core testing. The values were divided 
by 0.85 to adjust for the lower compressive strength from cores. The adjusted values of 
the compressive strength from the cores did not vary much from the cylinder compressive 
strength which confirmed that the cylinders were representative ofthe actual strength. 
Table 3.8 -Mechanical Properties of Concrete Based Products at Test Age 
Compressive Strength (MPa) MOE(MPa) MOR(MPa) 
RC FA-WF RC FA-WF RC 
SFRC-3.5 26.47 N/A 21240 N/A 3.51 
SFRC-5.5 28.36 N/A 26060 N/A 
1-RC 30.26 N/A 25430 N/A 
2-RC 30.26 N/A 25430 N/A 
1-H 16.78 11.64 21750 6980 2.47 
2-H 28.36 10.74 26060 4870 
H-A 29.75 10.77 26710 7190 3.18 
H-AlF 29.75 10.77 26710 7190 3.18 
H-B 16.78 11.76 21750 6980 2.47 
H-B/F 16.78 10.82 21750 6980 2.47 
H-FG 29.75 10.77 26710 7190 3.18 
H-FG-A/F 29.75 10.77 26710 7190 3.18 
H-FG-B/F 29.75 10.77 26710 7190 3.18 
Umt Conversion: 1.00 MPa=145 psi 
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Table 3.9 - Core Data 
Core 1 Core2 Core 3 
UD 1.6 1.94 1.87 
fc (Mpa) 18.25 17.81 16.73 
Average (Mpa) 17.60 
Unit Conversion 1.00 MPa=145 psi 
3.2.2 Modulus of Elasticity. The same 100 mm by 200 mm (4 in x 8 in) cylinders 
were used to determine the modulus of elasticity (MOE). This test was performed at 28 
days and on the test date. For this test ASTM C 469/C469M-10 was followed. A 
manually recorded compressometer and the Forney LC-4 were used for all the MOE 
tests. 
The comprsessometer that was used consists of 2 yokes with a digital dial gage set 
up in the direction of compression connecting the yokes along with spring and pivot rod 
opposite the dial gage. The pivot rod was used to maintain a constant distance while the 
allowing only the side with the dial gage to move thus causing the deflection seen by the 
dial gage to be twice the actual deflection, a correction that is calibrated in the dial gage. 
Figure 3.15 illustrates the compressometer attached to a cylinder in the Forney LC-4. 
The ultimate strength of the cylinders was necessary to determine where data points 
would be taken so to determine the ultimate strength a cylinder was tested to failure in 
compression prior to determining MOE. The two remaining cylinders that make up a 
complete test for compressive strength were used to determine the MOE before they were 
tested to failure in compression. Each specimen was fitted with the compressometer and 
then loaded at a 2.3 kN/sec (560 lb/sec) rate until 40% of ultimate strength then unloaded 
47 
with no recording of data. After this initial loading the cylinder was then loaded with data 
points taken at .5%, 1% and 1.5% strain then at 20%, 30% and 40% of ultimate strength. 
Several data points were taken to develop an elastic stress-strain relationship as a check 
on the accuracy of the calculations. This was found for the SFRC and WFF A and the 
procedure did not differ for either material. The MOE was found by taking the difference 
of the first and last stress points divided by the difference of the first and last strain points 
as illustrated in Equation 3.1. 
(3.1) 
Figure 3.15 - Compressometer for Determining MOE 
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The MOE's for each panel are recorded in Table 3.8. The values found during 
testing were close to the ACI 318-08 8.5.1 approximation for concrete with the exception 
of the FA-WF material. FA-WF is a non-concrete based material so the lack of 
correlation with the ACI code is expected. A large disparity was noticed in the MOE 
values for the FA-WF material which suggest an error in the measurements as the mix 
proportions and materials did not vary. 
3.2.3 Modulus of Rupture. The modulus of rupture (MOR) was determined 
using two 605 x 150 x 150 mm (24 x 6 x 6 in) samples tested at 28 days and on the test 
date. The test specimens were fabricated according ASTM C192/C 192M-07 and tested 
according to ASTM C78/C78M-10. The beams were placed in two lifts with 50 rods after 
each lift, using a 16 mm (0.63 in) tamping rod, and were hammered 25 times with a 
rubber mallet. The beams were stripped after 1 day and then allowed to cure next to the 
panels until testing. 
A Tinius Olsen testing machine was used for testing MOR beams, which were 
loaded in a three point loading configuration. To center the beam, lines were drawn 
around the beam at the loading locations. The two base loads were placed approximately 
76 mm (3.0 in) from each end of the beam, while the two interior action loads were 
located on the top of the beam 150 mm ( 6.0 in) inward from the base loads leaving 150 
mm (6.0 in) between the two loads. The beam was set into place on the Tinius Olsen and 
then the software was configured for MOR testing using an existing file on the computer. 
The beam was then loaded at 2.25 kN/sec (50 lb/sec) until fracture. As long as the 
fracture was in the middle third the test satisfied the standard, the lines drawn around the 
beam allowed easy verification of this. All the MOR specimens tested were acceptable. 
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Table 3.8 shows the values of MOR for the test age specimens. Only the first two 
batches were tested for MOR. No FA-WF specimens were made or tested for MORas the 
material was used as a sacrificial layer. The values from this were similar to the empirical 
model predicted values found with equation 9-10 from ACI 318-08. 
3.2.4 Material Density. The material density was determined by using the 100 x 
200 mm ( 4 x 8 in) compressive cylinders. The density was determined with two different 
methods, using volume and mass and using water displacement method. The volume and 
mass is a very simplistic method but can also be inaccurate. For this method the diameter 
of a cylinder was measured twice at the top, middle and bottom of the cylinder to the 
nearest 0.025 mm (0.001 in). The height of the cylinder was also measured at four 
different locations to the nearest 0.025 mm (0.001 in). After all the dimensional 
measurements were recorded, a dry mass was found for the cylinder by taking a dry 
specimen and massing it on a scale. From the dimensional measurements the volume was 
calculated and then once the volume was calculated the material density was calculated 
by dividing the dry mass by the volume. 
The second method uses a scale with an under-mount hook attachment. The scale 
was placed on a table with a hole in it, and the hook was attached to the bottom of the 
scale and hung down through the hole in the table and the hook supported a platform that 
extended into a water bath. To determine the density the dry and wet mass must be found. 
The dry mass was found in the last method leaving the wet mass, which is found by 
placing the specimen on the platform so that it is submerged. Volume is calculated with 
Eq. 3.2 by taking the difference of the dry mass (M) and wet mass (Ms) divided by the 
density of the water (Pw), which was taken as 997 kg/m3 (1.93 slug/ft3), which is the 
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density of water at 25°C (77°F). The testing setup for the second method is illustrated in 
Figure 3.16 and the values for the densities of the SFRC and FA-WF are displayed in 
Table 3.10. The values found using both methods were very similar, which adds 
confidence to the values found. 
(3.2) 
Table 3.10 - Material Densities 
Material Density (kglm 3) 
Material Method 1 Method 2 
SFRC 2276.2 2274.2 
FA-WF 1497.0 1508.3 
j_ Untt Conversion: 1.00 kg/m - 0.00194 slug/ft3 
Figure 3.16 - Water Bath Setup for Density 
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3.2.5 Tensile Capacity of Polyurea. The tensile capacity and fiber ratio of the 
polyurea were the two properties determined for that material. These properties allowed 
for comparison to an earlier study done on the characterization of the polyurea. The 
tensile capacity was found using a combination of ASTM D3039/D3039M-08 and ASTM 
D7565/D7565M-10. The samples were constructed by spraying the polyurea on a greased 
metal sheet. Upon cooling and solidifying of the polyurea, the polyurea was peeled off 
the metal sheet. The polyurea sheets were then cut into 40 mm (1.6 in) by 230 mm (9.0 
in) coupons. One of the variations from the ASTM was the specimen size; the ASTM 
however, does state that the geometry of the specimens and gripping mechanisms are in 
large part an art due to a lack of industrial consensus. An approximately 130 mm (5.0 in) 
gage length was marked on the specimens for installation in the lnstron 4485 available at 
the Missouri S&T. The polyurea specimens were tested without end tabs as 
recommended by Carey and Myers (2010). The Instron was programmed with a data 
acquisition software for testing, and was set up for testing a metal coupon. The e-glass 
DFRP specimens and the plain polyurea A specimens were loaded until failure while the 
plain polyurea B specimens were loaded past yielding but not till failure. The plain 
polyurea 8 samples did not fracture even when allowing the Instron to reach its 
maximum displacement. 
Table 3.11 shows a summary of the results from coupon tests. Polyurea 8 with 
discrete E-glass fibers resulted in the highest tensile yield strength in the set from this 
project. There was great variance in the values for the tensile yield strength in the E-glass 
DFRP specimens. This was due in part to air pockets that developed during the specimen 
fabrication. The air pockets only affected some specimens and resulted in quick tearing of 
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the specimen through the air pockets. Also since the glass fiber is blown into the polyurea 
as the polyurea is applied to the panel, it is impossible to achieve a perfect distribution of 
fiber. To help account for the variance in the results, the fiber ratio of each coupon 
specimen was determined. 
Table 3.11 - Polyurea Test Results 
Yield Strain@ MOE Stress@ Polyurea Strength Break Elongation Fiber 
(Mpa) Yield(%) (MPa) (Mpa) (%) Ratio(%) 
XS-100 Average 1.421 1.021 284.354 4.213 91.423 
(A) Std. Dev. 0.185 0.374 48.265 0.197 5.243 N/A 
cov 0.130 0.366 0.170 0.047 0.057 
XS-100F Average 1.643 0.707 457.299 4.519 8.528 19.0096 
(A/F) Std. Dev. 0.380 0.523 229.728 0.823 3.005 1.9276 
cov 0.231 0.739 0.502 0.182 0.352 0.1014 
XS-430 Average 1.565 1.589 106.665 5.040 355.187 
(B)* Std. Dev. 0.263 0.403 21.658 0.215 9.597 N/A 
cov 0.168 0.254 0.203 0.043 0.027 
XS-430F Average 2.563 1.329 288.005 4.639 23.018 6.527265 
(B/F) Std. Dev. 0.675 0.473 257.018 0.912 15.483 1.410193 
cov 0.263 0.355 0.892 0.196 0.673 0.216047 
Umt ConversiOn: 1.00 MPa=145 pst 
*The XS-430 (B) sample did not reach failure so the stress at break and elongation are 
from the last point recorded 
3.2.6 Fiber Ratio. Another important property is the fiber ratio of the glass fiber 
polyurea. To determine the fiber ratio a bum-off test, also referred to as the ignition loss 
test, was run in accordance to ASTM D3171/D3171M-ll procedure G. After the discrete 
fiber specimens were tested in the Instron 4485 they were then cut into 40 mm (1.6 in) by 
50 mm (2 in) specimens in preparation for the bum-off test. These specimens were cut 
from the coupon specimens after they were tested. The initial mass of the specimen, and 
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specimen plus glass slide was recorded then the samples were placed in a muffle furnace 
which was set to 600°C (lll2°F) for 2 hours to melt down the polyurea and leave behind 
the glass fibers. After allowing the specimens to cool the mass of the glass slide plus 
remnants (glass fibers), and the glass slide by itself were recorded. The muffle furnace, a 
sample before the ignition loss and that sample after the ignition loss are displayed in 
Figure 3.17. The fiber ratio was then found as a simple mass ratio of the mass of the 
glass fibers to the initial mass of the specimen. These values are reported in Table 3.11. 
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(a) Specimen Before (b) Specimen After 
(c) Muffle Furnace 
Figure 3.17 - Ignition Loss Testing 
The high fiber ratio in the discrete fiber polyurea A specimens help explain the 
low elongation values recorded for those specimens. The ignition loss and tensile data for 
the DFRP specimens are reported in Appendix C , and graphs of the tensile data are 
reported in Appendix D. 
55 
4. EXPERIMENTAL TEST RESULTS 
This study evaluated the performance of FA-WF, e-glass DFRP, and steel fiber 
reinforced concrete as a composite panel under blast loading. The test procedure was 
reported in Section 3 .1. The following is an evaluation of the blast mitigation 
performance based primarily on visual inspection. The crack widths reported in the later 
sections were measured by using images of the cracks and AutoCAD to measure the 
crack widths. The images with AutoCAD annotations are located in Appendix E. The 
sides of the panel are referred to as top face or compression face for the surface that faces 
the ceiling of the alcove and the bottom face or tension face for the surface that faces the 
floor of the alcove. The rest of the faces are described as if you were standing at the entry 
of the alcove and looking at panel. Figure 4.1 displays how the faces of the panel were 
named. Figure 4.1 was captured looking into one of the alcoves of the Wombat mine. 
Left Side 
Back Face 
Front Face Ride Side 
Figure 4.1 -Configuration of Typical Panel 
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4.1 3.5" SFRC CONTROL PANEL (SFRC-3.5) 
The SFRC-3.5 panel consisted of a 90. mm (3.5 in) thick layer of steel fiber 
reinforced concrete. The panel was tested with only one blast event of 1.4 kg (3.0 lb) 
charge at 310 mm (12 in). This panel was to examine how beneficial the FA-WF layer is 
and will later be compared to the 2-H panel. The initial pre blast images are illustrated in 
Figure 4.2. 
(a) Front Profile View (b) Isometric View 
Figure 4.2 - Panel SFRC-3.5 Prior to Blast Event 
The blast event resulted in significant damage to the panel. A large 10. mm (0.39 
in) wide flexural crack illustrated in Figures 4.3b and 4.3c, extended along the bottom of 
the panel and resulted in spalling in the center of the panel (Figure 4.3c ). Evidence of 
concrete crushing was observed on the compression and is illustrated in Figure 4.3a. 
This damage indicates that the panel failed structurally and at containing the blast. 
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(a) Concrete Crushing on Compression Face (b) Flexural Cracks on Front Face 
(c) Flexural Crack and Spalling on Tension Face 
Figure 4.3- Panel SFRC-3.5 After Blast Event, 1.4 kg at 310 mm 
4.2 5.5" SF~C CONTROL PANEL (SFRC-5.5) 
The SFRC-5.5 panel consisted of a 140 mm (5 .5 in) thick layer of steel fiber 
reinforced concrete. This panel test was to evaluate how beneficial the FA-WF layer was 
as a sacrificial layer. This panel will later be compared to panel 2-H. The initial pre-blast 
images are illustrated in Figure 4.4. 
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(a) Front Profile View (b) Isometric View 
Figure 4.4 - Panel SFRC-5.5 Prior to Blast Events 
After the first blast event of 1.4 kg (3.0 lb) at a 31 mm (12 in) standoff, very little 
damage was identified. In fact residual deflection and cracking was unnoticeable. The 
only evident damage was scarring on the top of the panel from the blast wires (Figure 
4.5b and 4.5c) and a small tensile crack in the center of the tension face of the panel 
(Figure 4.5 d). 
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(a) Front Profile View (b) Isometric View 
(c) Compression Face from Right (b) Tension Face from Back 
Figure 4.5- Panel SFRC-5.5 After First Blast Event, 1.4 kg at 310 mm 
The second blast event- a 1.4 kg (3 .0 lb) charge at 150 mm (6.0 in) standoff-
resulted in an increase in observed damage; however the damage was not very 
significant. The primary damage was a few flexural cracks in the front face , with the 
largest crack being 3.4 mm (0.13 in) wide (Figure 4.6c and 4.6d) and it continued across 
the bottom contributing to spalling (Figure 4.6d) on the tension face. The residual 
deflection observed in this panel was minimal, but recordable. Overall the panel was able 
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to withstand the blast without losing significant integrity. However, given the objective of 
this research is to contain the blast, this panel failed because some spalling occurred, 
which could cause damage or injury if it occurred in practice. 
(a) Back Profile View (b) Isometric View 
(c) Flexural Cracks on Back Face (d) Spalling on Tension Face 
Figure 4.6 - Panel SFRC-5.5 After Second Blast Event, 1.4 kg at 150 mm 
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4.3 PLAIN RC CONTROL PANEL 1 (1-RC) 
The first plain reinforced concrete control panel consisted of a 90. mm (3.5 in) 
thick layer of plain reinforced concrete. This panel was subjected to a single blast event 
with the standoff distance being 150 mm (6.0 in). This panel was to compare the different 
stand-off distances and will later be compared to 2-RC. Images of the initial setup and 
panel condition are illustrated in Figure 4. 7. 
(a) Front Profile View (b) Compression Face From Front 
Figure 4.7- Panel1-RC Prior to Blast Event 
The blast event consisting of 1.4 kg (3.0 lb) charge at a 150 mm (6.0 in) standoff 
caused tremendous damage to this panel resulting in several shear failures including a 
large hole that developed due to shear punching and a large shear crack near the support. 
The large hole is illustrated in Figures 4.8b, 4.8e, and 4.8f. The large hole also resulted 
in unbonded rebar and a large amount of rubble to be ejected from the panel. This means 
that this panel performed poorly at containing the blast. Figure 4.8c illustrates the large 
shear cracks that opened up resulting in significant residual deflections. While shear 
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attributed to the most of the damage Figures 4.8d - 4.8e illustrates some flexural cracks 
which were all less than 0.60 mm (0.024 in) wide. Also, some patterned cracking in the 
form of an X shape developed on the surface of the panel and is illustrated in Figure 
4.8b. The x-pattem cracking is a result of the reflected blast wave. First a compression 
wave hits the center of the panel then it radiates toward the edges where some of the 
wave is reflected back as a tension wave toward the center of the panel due to the 
difference in density between the air and panel. The lines where these stresses meet form 
the x -pattern cracking. 
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(a) Front Profile View (b) Compression Face From Front 
(c) Shear Crack in the Front Face (d) Flexural Cracks in the Back Face 
(e) Hole From Above the Panel (f) Debris and Tension Face 
Figure 4.8- Panell-RC After Blast Event, 1.4 kg at 150 mm 
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4.4 PLAIN RC CONTROL PANEL 2 (2-RC) 
The second plain reinforced concrete control panel (2-RC) consisted of a 90. mm 
(3.5 in) thick layer of plain reinforced concrete and was identical to the first plain 
reinforced control panel (1-RC). Both the 1-RC and 2-RC panels were tested to compare 
the different stand-off distances. A comparison between 1-RC and 2-RC is presented later 
in this section. The 2-RC panel was tested with one blast event with a 310 mm (12 in) 
stand-off. Images of the initial setup and panel condition are illustrated in Figure 4.9. 
(a) Front Profile View (b) Compression Face From Front 
Figure 4.9- Panel 2-RC Prior to Blast Event 
The 1.4 kg (3 lb) charge at 310 mm (12 in) blast event resulted in significant 
damage to the panel including substantial flexural cracking which resulted in large 
residual deflections. The largest flexural crack observed in the 2-RC panel was 1.2 mm 
(0.047 in) wide. Figure 4.10c shows these flexural cracks did propagate vertically 
through the panel and Figure 4.10d shows, one crack extended across the bottom of the 
panel. Also Figure 4.10d shows a large chunk has spalled off the panel. This indicates 
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that the panel did not sufficiently contain or mitigate the blast event and allowed some 
material to be ejected and fragment from the panel. The overall damage is relatively large 
for the blast event tested. 
(a) Front Profile View (b) Compression Face From Front 
(c) Flexural Cracks in the Front Face (d) Tension Face From Front 
Figure 4.10- Panel2-RC After Blast Event, 1.4 kg at 310 mm 
Comparing the panels 1-RC and 2-RC it can be observed that the level of damage 
m 1-RC is significantly greater. The residual deflections are greater and the loss of 
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material is substantially larger in 1-RC. It is important to note how the majority of the 
damage in 2-RC was flexural damage and in panel 1-RC it was shear damage. The shear 
damage in panel 1-RC is likely due to a more concentrated and higher magnitude load 
from the shorter stand-off distance; whereas, in panel 2-RC the larger stand-off distance 
allowed the load to be distributed over a greater area and also decreased the magnitude of 
the distributed load-the 3D-models from Con WEP that predicted the pressure 
distribution illustrate this theory and are presented in Appendix B. This would mean that 
the two blast events tested in this study work in two different fashions suggesting that 
while sequential blast events will have a tendency to build upon the damage from the 
previous event in this case significant damage can be distinguished as unique to a certain 
event. 
4.5 FA-WF CONTROL PANEL 1 (1-H) 
The first FA-WF control panel contains a 90. mm (3.5 in) layer of SFRC and then 
a 50 mm (2 in) sacrificial layer of FA-WF. This panel corresponds to the atypical 
concrete strength from batch 2. Test age compressive strengths for all the panels were 
reported in Table 3.8. This panel will be compared to panels 2-H, H-8 and H-8/F, later 
in their respective sections. Initial images of the pre-blast condition of this panel are 
illustrated in Figure 4.11. 
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(a) Front Profile View (b) Isometric View 
Figure 4.11- Panel1-H Prior to Blast Events 
After the first blast event, which was a 1.4 kg (3.0 lb) charge at a 310 mm (12 in) 
standoff, some slight damage was noticed on the compression face and a crack developed 
through the panel. Scarring and cratering developed on the compression face of this panel 
is illustrated in Figure 4.12b. A 0.36 mm (0.14 in) wide flexural crack developed during 
the blast and runs along one of the rails from the rebar chairs, which is illustrated in 
Figure 4.12d. The crack propagated all the way through to the extreme compression fiber 
of the front face of the SFRC layer and is illustrated in Figures 4.12a and 4.12c. Several 
other much less significant cracks also developed during the blast event. There was some 
spalling, cratering and cracking that developed in the center of the panel indicating that a 
punching failure may occur at higher threat levels. 
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(a) Front Profile View (b) Isometric View 
(c) Flexural Crack in the Front Face (d) Flexural Crack in the Tension Face 
Figure 4.12- 'Panel1-H After First Blast Event, 1.4 kg at 310 mm 
After the second blast, which was a 1.4 kg (3.0 lb) charge at 150 mm (6.0 in) 
standoff, a combined flexural and punching failure was observed. The crack that 
developed after the first event opened up exposing the debonded rebar. A large 330 mm 
(13 in) diameter hole was also punched through the center of the panel. The second blast 
event caused tremendous damage and ejected many fragments of concrete through the 
back of the panel. Figures 4.12a and 4.12b illustrate this damage. Although the damage 
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was great, the rebar prevented the panel from full separation and limited the 
fragmentation of the panel. The de bonded rebar in the center of the panel and in the large 
crack are illustrated in Figures 4.13c and 4.13d, respectively. Also Figure 4.13c 
illustrates the FA-WF and SFRC layers separated indicating delamination occurred 
between the layers. Figure 4.13e illustrates the large 110 mm (4.4 in) wide flexural-shear 
crack and some of the debris that was ejected from the panel. The large crack appears to 
be an expansion of the flexural crack from the first event with a shear action as many new 
diagonal cracks developed. Overall the panel performed poorly as it did not contain the 
second blast event, and instead allowed a significant amount of material to be ejected. 
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(a) Front Profile View (b) Isometric View 
(c) Punching Failure (d) Flexural-Shear Crack in the Back Face 
(e) Crack and Debris From Front 
Figure 4.13- Panell-H After Second Blast Event, 1.4 kg at 150 mm 
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4.6 FA-WF CONTROL PANEL 2 (2-H) 
The second FA-WF control panel is the same geometrically, 90. mm (3.5 in) 
SFRC layer and 50 mm (2 in) FA-WF sacrificial layer, as the 1st control. The only 
difference is the concrete strength is the typical strength, 27.6 MPa (4000 psi), found in 
most of the panels. This panel was compared to SFRC-3.5 and SFRC-5.5 to determine 
the impact of the FA-WF layer. The 2-H panel will be compared to 1-H to determine the 
impact of the strength of the SFRC layer later in this section. The 2-H panel will also be 
compared to H-FG, H-B and H-B/F in their respective sections. Images of the initial 
setup and panel condition are illustrated in Figure 4.14. 
(a) Front Profile View (b) Compression Face From Front 
Figure 4.14- Panel2-H Prior to Blast Events 
The 1.4 kg (3. 0 lb) charge at 310 mm ( 12 in) standoff blast event resulted in 
significant residual deflections and cracking. Figures 4.15c and 4.15d illustrate a 2.5 mm 
(0.098 in) wide flexural crack running across the bottom of the panel and also up the 
panel vertically respectively. Similarly to the 1-H panel this panel appears to have a 
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major flexural crack run along one of the chair legs. The compression face of the panel 
experienced some scarring and cratering (Figure 4.15b) and minimal cracking. Overall 
the panel performed very well against the first blast event. 
(a) Back Profile View (b) Compression Face From Back 
(c) Flexural Crack in the Tension Face (d) Flexural Crack in the Back Face 
Figure 4.15- Panel2-H After First Blast Event, 1.4 kg at 310 mm 
The 1.4 kg (3 .0 lb) charge at 150 mm (6.0 in) standoff blast event resulted in a 
punching shear failure along with continued propagation of the flexural crack. A small 
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152 mm (6 in) diameter hole was punched through the FA-WF layer and expanded to a 
310 mm ( 12in) diameter hole once it reached the extreme tension fiber in the SFRC layer 
as illustrated in Figures 4.16c and 4.16d. The flexural crack expanded slightly from 2.5 
mm (0.098 in) to 2.6 mm (0.1 0 in), but did not open up significantly until it neared the 
center of the panel as illustrated in Figures 4.16e and 4.16f. A large shear crack and 
delamination between the FA-WF and SFRC layers is illustrated in Figure 4.16e. The 
impact of the delamination of the two layers is illustrated in the Figure 4.16b by the 
pieces of the sacrificial FA-WF layer that broke off. The hole that punched through the 
panel was the most significant damage and resulted in a pile of debris that was ejected 
from the panel and is illustrated in Figure 4.16f. The panel performed poorly in 
containing the blast and, with all the cracking and the puncture, the panel has lost most of 
its structural integrity. 
74 
(a) Back Profile View (b) Compression Face From Back 
(c) Hole in the Compression Face (d) Hole in the Tension Face 
(e) Flexural Cracks in the Back Face (f) Tension Face from Back 
Figure 4.16- Panel 2-H After Second Blast Event, 1.4 kg at 150 mm 
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In comparison to 1-H, 2-H performed much better with much less significant 
damage. The panels performed similarly after the first blast event with 2-H performing 
slightly better in residual deflections and exhibiting smaller flexural cracking. The major 
difference was seen in damage from the second blast event. A larger hole developed in 1-
H and the cracking and residual deflections were much more severe in 1-H. This suggests 
that the higher strength SFRC performs better under blast loading. This was the expected 
result and allows for later panels to be compared to each other despite the disparity in 
compressive strengths. 
The 2-H panel performed much better than the SFRC-3.5 panel. The residual 
deflections and cracking observed in panel 2-H were less severe than the residual 
deflections and cracking observed in the SFRC-3.5 panel. This indicates that adding the 
FA-WF layer does reduce damage. The extra layer adds a significant improvement in 
blast mitigation over the plain SFRC panel. Comparing 2-H to SFRC-5.5 the level of 
damage is dramatically different. A hole punched all the way through the center of 2-H, 
while only spalling occurred on the bottom of SFRC-5.5. Also the residual deflection in 
2-H was significantly greater than SFRC-5.5. Overall the SFRC-5.5 outperformed the 2-
H panel. 
4.7 FA-WF FOAM-GAP CONTROL PANEL (H-FG) 
The FA-WF foam-gap control panel has a 50 mm (2 in) FA-WF layer and 90. mm 
(3.5 in) SFRC base separated by a 76 mm (3.0 in) foam gap. This panel was compared 
with the 1-H and 2-H panels and will be later compared to the H-FG-NF and H-FG-B/F 
panels. Images ofthe initial setup and panel condition are illustrated in Figure 4.17a. The 
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first image, Figure 4.17a, was captured outside the Wombat mine, while the other image, 
Figure 4.17b, was captured inside the Wombat mine. 
(a) Back Profile View (b) Compression Face From Front 
Figure 4.17- Panel H-FG Prior to Blast Event 
The 1.4 kg (3 lb) charge at 310 mm (12 in) standoff blast event resulted in 
significant damage and resulted in most of the sacrificial FA-WF layer being removed. 
Upon first inspection the panel H-FG appears to be mostly intact as although the blast 
event fragmented the FA-WF layer into many pieces, the pieces remained on the panel as 
illustrated in Figure 4.18b. Figure 4.18e illustrates that after removing the detached FA-
WF pieces, only limited amounts of the sacrificial FA-WF layer remains. A large 2.9 mm 
(0.11 in) wide flexural crack developed through the midline ofthe panel and is illustrated 
in Figures 4.18c and 4.18d. The damage was so extensive that a second blast was 
deemed unnecessary. Since nearly all the FA-WF layer was removed from the frrst blast 
event, the damage from a second blast would be unrepresentative of damage on this panel 
type. 
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Comparing panel H-FG to panels 1-H and 2-H the damage is similar with more 
damage observed in the H-FG panel. They all exhibited flexural damage after the first 
event. One major difference in damage between the panels was the residual deflection 
observed after the first blast event in the H-FG panel was much greater than the residual 
deflections observed in 1-H and 2-H panels. Another major difference was that the FA-
WF remained intact with the exception of a few pieces in the 1-H and 2-H panels, but 
was nearly completely removed from the H-FG panel. This is a result of the FA-WF layer 
collapsing into the foam-gap. The H-FG panel was expected to perform better than the 1-
R and 2-H panels because the foam-gap increases the stand-off distance to the base panel 
and as standoff distance increases the blast pressure reduces exponentially. Overall the H-
FG panel performed slightly worse than the 1-H and 2-H panels. 
(a) Front Profile View (b) Isometric View 
(c) Flexural Crack in the Back Face (d) Flexural Crack Tension Face 
(e) Compression Face After FA-WF Pieces were Cleared Off 
Figure 4.18- Panel H-FG After the Blast Event, 1.4 kg at 310 mm 
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4.8 FA-WF XS100 PANEL (H-A) 
The H-A panel has a 50 mm (2 in) FA-WF layer, 90. mm (3.5 in) SFRC base, and 
a 5 mm (0.25 in) XS 100 plain polyurea coating. This panel was constructed in the first 
batch and consisted of concrete which is the typical strength or 27.5 MPa ( 4000 psi). This 
panel was compared to 2-H panel, and will later be compared to the H-B, H-AJF, and H-
FG-AJF panels. The initial setup and panel condition are illustrated in Figure 14.19. 
(a) Front Profile View (b) Isometric View 
Figure 4.19 - Panel H-A Prior to Blast Events 
The first blast event-a 1.4 kg (3 lb) charge at a 310 mm (12 in) standoff-
created minor damage. Some scarring and cracking was noticed but nothing that 
indicated the panel was close to failure. Due to the sides being partially coated with the 
polyurea it was difficult to detect any cracking. Some cracking was found in the 
sacrificial FA-WF layer and a small piece ofthe comer detached completely as illustrated 
in Figure 4.20c. The compression face showed scarring near the center below where the 
charge was placed (Figure 4.20d) and several small cracks developed in the FA-WF 
layer but there was no indication of imminent punching failure. The residual deflection 
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was minor showing that the composite acted elastically to the blast. This is the ideal 
outcome and indicates the panel sufficiently absorbed the blast without significant 
damage or fragmentation. Figure 4.20a illustrates the left side of the panel fell from the 
support which indicates the panel moved rather significantly during the blast event. The 
piece ofF A-WF that chipped off may be contributed to the action of the panel falling on 
the ground or directly to the explosion. 
(a) Front Profile View (b) Isometric View 
(c) Detached FA-WF Piece (d) Compression Face from Right 
Figure 4.20- Panel H-A After First Blast Event, 1.4 kg at 310 mm 
81 
The second blast event-a 1.4 kg (3.0 lb) charge at a 150 mm (6.0 in) standoff-
significantly increased the damage, but the panel system still contained the blast. The 
residual deflections increased dramatically and the cracking in the SFRC and FA-WF 
also increased. Several large pieces of the sacrificial FA-WF layer detached from the 
panel, which is illustrated in Figures 4.2lb, 4.21d, and 4.21e. This suggests that the 
bond between the SFRC and FA-WF layers is rather weak. A large bulge, which is 
illustrated in Figure 4.21c, developed in the polyurea under the panel indicating that the 
SFRC fragmented and attempted to punch through the polyurea layer. However, there 
was no tearing in the polyurea layer, so the panel adequately sustained the blast without 
allowing any material to penetrate through the other side of the panel. If this had been a 
non-structural wall or floor panel it would have been considered successful in containing 
the specific blast pressure tested. The FA-WF layer above the bulge in the center of the 
panel did not show any signs ofpunching, as illustrated in Figure 4.21b, suggesting that 
the two layers delaminated. Figure 4.21f illustrates a location where there was significant 
delamination between the SFRC and sacrificial FA-WF layers. A 1.7 mm (0.067 in) wide 
flexural crack is illustrated in Figure 4.21e. The large residual deflection, cracks, and 
large bulge indicate the panel failed in the traditional sense of strength design. The cracks 
and residual deflection indicate a flexural failure, where the steel likely exceeded its 
yielding stress and while the panel still has some capacity it would probably have a 
dramatic failure upon further loading. The bulge suggests a complete shear failure at that 
section of the panel, meaning the panel has little to no capacity for further loading in the 
center of the panel. 
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(a) Front Profile View (b) Isometric View 
(c) Large Bulge in Tension Face (d) FA-WF Pieces Compression Face 
(e) Large Crack Back Face of Panel (f) Crack and Delamination Front Face 
Figure 4.21 -Panel H-A After Second Blast Event, 1.4 kg at 150 mm 
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The damage seen in the H-A panel was much less significant than the damage 
seen in the 2-H panel. The modes of damage and failure were similar in the two panels as 
each exhibited flexural cracking and shear punching. The 2-H panel had a large hole 
punch through the panel which allowed debris to be ejected from the panel, which 
resulted in the panel unsuccessfully containing the blast. The H-A panel contained the 
blast event allowing only pieces of the FA-WF to fragment and an apparent punching 
failure where the rubble was contained in the bulging polyurea layer. The H-A panel 
deflected a little more than the 2-H panel suggesting the polyurea layer may increase 
residual deflections by containing the material. This can be understood with momentum. 
The 2-H panel was able to dissipate a tremendous amount of momentum through jetting 
fragments, whereas the H-A panel contained the fragments causing the momentum to 
spread through the panel increasing residual deflections. The polyurea layer contained a 
large amount of material but that caused increased residual deflection. 
4.9 FA-WF XSlOOF PANEL (H-A/F) 
The H-A/F panel has a 50 mm (2 in) FA-WF layer, 90. mm (3.5 in) SFRC base, 
and a 6.4 mm (0.25 in) XS 100 polyurea coating with discrete glass fibers. The panel was 
compared with the 2-H and H-A, and will later be compared to the H-FG-A/F and H-B/F. 
The initial pre-blast images are illustrated in Figure 4.22. 
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(a) Front Profile View (b) Isometric View 
Figure 4.22 - Panel H-AlF Prior to Blast Events 
The first blast event, which was a 1.4 kg (3.0 lb) charge at a 310 mm (12 in) 
standoff, resulted in very minimal changes in the panel. The residual deflection was slight 
and though cracking was observed in the FA-WF on the compression face, this was the 
only location where cracking could be observed. Again scarring was found directly below 
where the charge was placed and is illustrated in Figure 4.23c. Figures 4.23c and 4.23d 
illustrates the cracks in the top sacrificial FA-WF layer and in Figure 4.23d the cracks 
were outlined with a permanent marker so they would show up better when 
photographed. A few less than 0.5 mm (0.02 in) wide flexural cracks also developed in 
the panel though none propagated all the way through the panel suggesting elastic 
behavior in the panel. Overall the panel performed very well against this first blast event, 
with little recordable damage. In Figures 4.23a and 4.23b some debris appears to have 
gathered on the top of the panel, but this debris was fragments of rock that fell from the 
ceiling of the Wombat mine. 
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(a) Front Profile View (b) Isometric View 
(c) Right Side Top View (d) Isometric View Cracks Outlined 
Figure 4.23- Panel H-A/F After First Blast Event, 1.4 kg at 310 mm 
The second blast event, which was a 1.4 kg (3 lb) charge at a 150 mm (6.0 in) 
standoff, resulted in significant damage and tearing in the polyurea layer. The tearing in 
the polyurea layer is illustrated in Figure 4.24e and means the panel failed its purpose, to 
contain the blast. Figure 4.24e was captured inside the Wombat and shows the tearing in 
the polyurea layer and a large amount of debris that punched through the panel, while 
Figure 4.24f was captured outside the Wombat and shows the bottom of the panel and 
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the exposed rebar and chair. A large 6.5 mm (2.6 in) flexural crack expanded upon the 
crack formed from the first blast event. The surface cracking also expanded upon cracks 
formed during the first blast event. A couple ofpieces of the sacrificial FA-WF layer that 
detached are illustrated in Figures 4.24b and 4.24c and delamination was also observed 
(Figure 4.24d) between the two layers. The panel failed through shear punching but did 
not appear to fail in flexure. So the E-glass DFRP system seemed to strengthen the panel 
against flexure; however, because of the decreased ductility when adding the E-glass 
fibers to the polyurea, the E-glass DFRP layer tore. 
(a) Front Profile View (b) Isometric View 
(c) Right Side Top View (d) Back Face Crack and Delamination 
(e) Polyurea Tear and Rubble Tension Face {f) Exposed Rebar and Chair Tension Face 
Figure 4.24 - Panel H-A/F After Second Blast Event, 1.4 kg at 150 mm 
87 
88 
This panel performed better than the 2-H panel in all respects but due to the 
tearing in the polyurea layer it performed worse than the H-A panel. Since both the 2-H 
and H-NF panels ejected some debris they were compared by estimating amount of 
debris and also by comparing residual deflections and the crack sizes/extent. In all of 
these categories the H-A/F panel performed better or nearly the same. From this it can be 
concluded that the e-glass DFRP layer provided some flexural strengthening to the panel. 
The H-NF panel had the smallest residual deflections of the three panels being 
compared. This is likely due to the additional strengthening from adding glass fibers to 
the polyurea. 
One of the main objectives of this research is to develop a material that can 
contain a blast without having any particles ejected. Given this the H-A/F panel has to be 
viewed as a failure. Also since the polyurea tore it is difficult to determine to what extent 
the glass fibers may have improved the strength, but it does indicate that the addition of 
the glass fibers decreased the ductility of the polyurea significantly enough to allow it to 
tear. The H-A panel was able to contain the second blast and thus gave better results than 
the H-NF panel, according to the objectives of this research. 
4.10 FA-WF XSlOOF FOAM-GAP PANEL (H-FG-A/F) 
The H-FG-B/F panel has a 50 mm (2 in) FA-WF layer, 76 mm (3.0 in) foam-gap 
formed with stryofoam insulated sheeting, and a 90. mm (3.5 in) SFRC base with a 6.4 
mm (0.25 in) XS 100 polyurea coating with discrete glass fibers applied to the tension 
face. This panel was compared to H-FG, H-A/F and H-A. This panel will later be 
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compared to H-FG-B/F. Images of the initial setup and panel are illustrated in Figure 
4.25. 
(a) Front Profile View (b) Isometric View 
Figure 4.25- H-FG-A/F Prior to Blast Events 
The 1.4 kg (3.0 lb) charge at 310 mm (12 in) standoff blast event resulted in a 
considerable amount of cosmetic damage to the panel and great damage to the FA-WF 
layer but the residual deflection and cracking noticed in the SFRC layer was negligible. 
Several large pieces of the FA-WF broke off the panel as illustrated in Figures 4.26b and 
4.26c. It appeared as though the FA-WF layer also cracked along the thicker support 
areas, suggesting end action, and along the steel reinforcement lines, suggesting a need 
for more reinforcement spaced closer together. In the SFRC layer it was difficult to 
observe cracking due to some polyurea on the sides, and with close examination no 
cracking was observed. While the damage appears to be dramatic this was a great result, 
because the FA-WF layer is intended as a sacrificial layer and there was no significant 
damage found in the SFRC layer. 
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(a) Front Profile View (b) Isometric View 
(c) Compression Face From Back 
Figure 4.26- H-FG-A/F After First Blast Event, 1.4 kg at 310 mm 
The second blast event resulted in even more dramatic cosmetic damage but once 
again little damage to the SFRC and polyurea. This time almost the entire FA-WF and 
Styrofoam layer was blasted off the panel, only a small piece of FA-WF remained and it 
was only attached to the rebar. The dramatic damage makes the panel appear to be nearly 
destroyed, but in actuality the SFRC layer has some significant cracking but no punching 
meaning the SFRC layer still has strength. A 3.3 mm (0.13 in) flexural crack is illustrated 
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in Figure 4.27c and indicates the panel may have failed in flexural strength meaning the 
reinforcement has yielded. However, the flexural cracks in Figure 4.27c do not appear to 
propagate through the member. This and rough surface of the SFRC in Figure 4.27d 
make it difficult to determine if there is any surface cracking on the SFRC but the large 
residual deflection suggests there was significant cracking. Figure 4.27e shows the 
tension face of the panel and as it is apparent there was no bulging. Figure 4.27f 
illustrates that there was no cratering or sign of shear punching near the center of the 
panel. As mentioned before much of the reason for limited damage in these panels is due 
to the increased stand-off distance from the air-gap. The decreased damage may be 
additionally attributable to shock impedance mismatch between the layers. Overall, this 
panel system performed very well and the best of the hybrid systems. 
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(a) Front Profile View (b) Isometric View 
(c) Flexural Crack Back Face (d) Rough Top Surface From Back 
(e) Tension Face View (f) Compression Face From Back 
Figure 4.27 - Panel H-FG-A/F After Second Blast Event, 1.4 kg at 150 mm 
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The H-FG-A/F panel performed the best of the panels tested so far. Most of the 
damage occurred in the sacrificial FA-WF, allowing the base SFRC to be exhibit only 
minor damage including, small residual deflection and limited cracking. When comparing 
this panel to the control (H-FG) the first event was used. Comparing Figures 4.1c and 
4.26b the level of damage to the FA-WF layers is dramatically different. In the control 
there was nearly no FA-WF left on the panel. The FA-WF layer held up much better in 
the H-FG-A/F indicating that the polyurea layer added to the panel's flexural strength. 
When comparing this panel to the H-A and H-AlF the most important thing to 
note is that there was no punching failure or apparent punching failure in the SFRC layer. 
This means that the H-FG-A/F panel was more than adequate at containing the blast. 
Some of the decreased damage may also be attributable to dissipation in the blast wave 
energy caused by having the foam-gap and from strengthening provided by the polyurea 
layer. 
4.11 FA-WF XS430 PANEL (H-B) 
The H-B panel has a 50 mm (2 in) FA-WF layer, 90. mm (3.5 in) SFRC base, and 
a 6.4 mm (0.25 in) XS430 plain polyurea coating. This panel was compared to 1-H and 
H-A. The panel will be compared to H-B/F and H-FG-B/F in their respective sections. 
The initial setup and panel condition are illustrated in Figure 4.28. 
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(a) Front Profile View (b) Isometric View 
Figure 4.28 - Panel H-B Prior to Blast Events 
After the first blast-a 1.4 kg (3.0 lb) charge at a 310 mm (12 in) standoff-the 
damage was very minimal and most of the noticeable damage was a FA-WF piece 
breaking off. In this panel some small less than 0.61 mm (0.024 in) wide shear cracks 
developed near the supports as illustrated in Figure 4.29c. The lack of flexural cracking 
may be attributed to the lower strength higher ductility SFRC and Polyurea layers found 
in this panel. Several surface cracks were observed in the FA-WF layer then they were 
outlined with permanent marker to show up better when photographed, as illustrated in 
Figure 4.29d. The residual deflection was minimal in this panel and overall the panel 
performed well against the first blast event. 
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(a) Front Profile View (b) Isometric View 
(c) Shear Cracking Front Face (d) Compression Face From Left Side 
Figure 4.29- Panel H-B After First Blast Event, 1.4 kg at 310 mm 
The second blast brought a significant increase in damage. The shear cracks that 
formed in the initial blast opened up to 4.5 mm (0.18 in) wide and propagated through the 
FA-WF layer (Figure 4.30c). Although the shear cracking was significant there was no 
apparent flexural cracking. For this panel shear was of much greater concern, including a 
large crater in the center of the panel indicating a shear punching failure occurred and is 
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illustrated in Figure 4.30d. Figure 4.30e illustrates the bulge that resulted from the shear 
punching failure. Although the bulge was very large no tearing was noticed in the 
polyurea layer. This means that the panel may have failed in regards to strength but for 
the purpose of containing the blast it was adequate. Overall the panel performed well and 
the highly ductile materials that made up the panel allowed it to deflect considerably 
without considerable flexural cracking. 
The H-B panel performed much better than panel 1-H. The 1-H panel exhibited 
significant shear cracking and shear punching failure that punctured through the panel 
after the second event. The H-B panel exhibited similar damage with less significant 
cracking than 1-H panel and instead a full puncture, which was present in the 1-H panel, 
the H-B exhibited bulging in the polyurea layer that indicates shear punching. This shows 
the one of the significant benefits of polyurea is containing spalling and fragmentation. 
In the H-B panel, the first event did not result in any visible flexural damage, which may 
be due to flexural strengthening from the polyurea layer. However, when comparing to 
the H-A panel, only the H-A panel exhibited visible flexural cracking after the first blast 
event. A possible explanation may be that polyurea B in combination with the lower 
strength concrete was a more elastic system allowing the panel to flex more without 
cracking. In addition to the lack of flexural cracks after the first event the H-B panel also 
exhibited better results in regards to overall residual deflection. This means that the H-B 
panel was able to better contain the blast while maintaining more residual structural 
integrity than the H-A panel 
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(a) Back Profile View (b) Isometric View 
(c) Shear Cracking Front Face (d) Cratering in Compression Face 
(e) Bulge in Tension Face 
Figure 4.30 - Panel H-B After Second Blast Event, 1.4 kg at 150 mm 
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4.12 FA-WF XS430F PANEL (H-B/F) 
The H-B/F panel has a 50 mm (2 in) FA-WF layer, 90. mm (3.5 in) SFRC base, 
and a 6.4 mm (0.25 in) XS430 polyurea coating with discrete glass fibers. This panel was 
compared to the 1-H, H-A/F, and the H-B panels and will later be compared to the H-FG-
B/F panel. The initial pre-blast images are illustrated in Figure 4.31. 
(a) Front Profile View (b) Isometric View 
Figure 4.31- Panel H-B/F Prior to Blast Events 
The first blast event, which was a 1.4 kg (3.0 lb) charge at a 310 mm (12 in) 
standoff, resulted in little damage. A small piece of the FA-WF broke off of the comer 
and several surface cracks also developed, which is illustrated in Figure 4.32b and 
4.32d. Several small less than 0.5 mm (0.02 in) flexural cracks did develop in this panel 
and are illustrated in Figure 4.32c. The small flexural cracks indicate that while the 
concrete exceeded its tensile strength the flexural steel did not yield. The flexural and 
surface cracks were outlined with permanent marker so they would show up when 
photographed. Scarring developed under the charge and is illustrated in Figure 4.32 d. 
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The residual deflections were insignificant and overall the panel contained the first blast 
event very well. 
(a) Front Profile View (b) Isometric View 
(c) Flexural Cracking in the Front Face (d) Compression Face From Left 
Figure 4.32- Panel H-B/F After First Blast Event, 1.4 kg at 310 mm 
The second blast event, which was 1.4 kg (3 .0 lb) charge at a 150 mm (6.0 in) 
standoff, increased the damage, but the panel was still able to contain the blast. Several 
additional flexural cracks developed, which are illustrated in Figure 4.33c, the ones 
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outlined in black are from the first even while the rest is new. Despite additional flexural 
cracks developing, all the flexural cracks observed were still less than 0.5 mm (0.02 in) 
wide. In addition to the flexural cracks a significant 3.5 mm (0.14 in) wide shear crack 
also developed propagating through the top of the SFRC layer (Figure 4.33d). A slight 
bulge developed in the tension face (Figures 4.33f and 4.33g) and the compression face 
exhibited a small crater (Figure 4.33 e), indicating a punching failure occurred. The 
panel exhibited both flexural and shear damage; however, it appears that the panel failed 
in shear only. While the SFRC layer may have failed with regards to strength the panel 
system adequately contained the blast. 
(a) Front Profile View (b) Isometric View 
Figure 4.33 - Panel H-B/F After Second Blast Event, 1.4 kg at 310 mm 
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(c) Shear Crack in the Front Face (d) Flexural Cracks in the Front Face 
(e) Compression Face From Left (f) Bulge in Tension Face 
(g) Bulge in Tension Face 
Figure 4.33 cont. - Panel H-B/F After Second Blast Event, 1.4 kg at 150 mm 
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This panel was able to contain the blast and exhibit the least amount of damage of 
all the non-foam-gap panels. When comparing to both the 1-H and H-AlF it is easy to 
determine this panel system outperformed them because it was not punctured. The lower 
strength more ductile polyurea B gives some understanding to why the H-B/F panel was 
not punctured and the H-A/F panel was. In addition to no presence of punctures, the H-
B/F panel had smaller residual deflections than either the 1-H or H-A/F panels. This 
panel however performed very similar to the H-B panel with a smaller bulge from the 
second blast event. Flexural cracking was not very prevalent in either the H-B/F than the 
H-B panel, which was unexpected as the two panels had the same strength SFRC layer 
and the intention of adding the discrete E-glass fibers to the polyurea was in part to 
improve the flexural strength ofthe composite. Both the H-B/F and H-B panels exhibited 
better flexural performance than any of the other panels. 
4.13 FA-WF XS430F FOAM-GAP PANEL (H-FG-B/F) 
The H-FG-B/F panel has a 50 mm (2 in) FA-WF layer, 76 mm (3.0 in) air-gap 
formed with stryofoam, and a 90. mm (3.5 in) SFRC base with a 6.4 mm (0.25 in) XS430 
polyurea coating with discrete glass fibers applied to the tension face. This panel will be 
compared to the H-FG, H-FG-A/F, H-B, and H-B/F panels later in this section. Images of 
the initial setup and panel are illustrated in Figure 4.34. 
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(a) Front Profile View (b) Isometric View 
Figure 4.34- Panel H-FG-B/F Prior to Blast Events 
The 1.4 kg (3.0 lb) charge at a 310 mm (12 in) standoff blast event did significant 
damage to the sacrificial FA-WF layer. Figure 4.35c shows where a piece has broken off 
and all the other surface cracks. The FA-WF layer cracked along the line of thicker 
supports indicating end action was present. It was noted from the shape and location of 
the cracks present in the FA-WF layer, that the layer would not be able to withstand 
additional loading. The SFRC panel appeared to have no significant damage as there was 
no visible cracking and the residual deflections were measured on the FA-WF layer so 
they appear more significant than the actual situation present in the SFRC layer. 
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(c) Back Profile View (d) Isometric View 
(c) Compression Face From Right 
Figure 4.35 - Panel H-FG-B/F After First Blast Event, 1.4 kg at 310 mm 
The 1.4 kg (3.0 lb) charge at a 150 mm (6.0 in) standoff blast event resulted in 
nearly all the FA-WF layer detaching from the panel and a significant flexural crack. 
Similarly to panel H-FG-A/F the damage is aesthetically very substantial but most of the 
damage was to the sacrificial FA-WF layer. Only a couple pieces of the FA-WF layer 
remained but even they were only attached to the reinforcement bars as illustrated in 
Figure 4.36b. The 1.2 mm (0.047 in) wide flexural cracks visible in Figure 4.36c 
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contributed to the residual deflection and suggest the rebar has yielded, meanmg the 
panel has failed in flexure. As illustrated in Figure 4.36d one of the flexural cracks 
continued along the surface. Figure 4.36e displays that despite the significant damage to 
the panel no bulging or tearing was exhibited in the polyurea layer. 
This panel and the H-FG-A/F panel performed the best at containing the blast 
while allowing the least amount of damage to the SFRC layer. The control H-FG lost 
most of its sacrificial layer during the first blast and while little damage was found in the 
SFRC layer, of the H-FG panel, the damage was similar to the damage found in the H-
FG-A/F and H-B/F-AG after the second blast event. TheE-glass DFRP-foam-gap panels 
only saw significant damage to the sacrificial layer and flexural cracking in the SFRC 
layer while the rest of the panels saw significant shear punching damage that reduced the 
panels to being structurally unsound. This means that the foam-gap panels were the best 
at containing the blast events tested. As mentioned earlier this limited damage is likely 
due to the increased stand-off distance provided by the presence of the foam-gap. 
Comparing H-FG-A/F and H-FG-B/F it is a little more difficult but the only 
important measurable difference is the residual deflections. From this the H-FG-B/F 
panel was slightly better at containing the blast. 
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(a) Front Profile View (b) Isometric View 
(c) Flexural Cracks Front Face (d) Crack in the Compression Face 
(e) Tension Face 
Figure 4.36 - Panel H-FG-B/F After Second Blast Event, 1.4 kg at 150 mm 
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4.14 RESIDUAL DEFLECTIONS 
The residual deflections were found to provide some quantitative data. The 
process of obtaining the deflections can be found in Section 3.1.3. The results from the 
residual deflection data were used in the comparisons of panels present the earlier 
sections of Chapter 4. To better visualize the data, bar graphs were created for each blast 
event. Figures 4.37 and 4.38, and Table 4.1 display the residual deflection data for the 
first and second blast event. Some panels do not have data for a certain event, which is a 
result of either that blast event was not tested on that panel, or the damage of some of the 
panels made it difficult or impossible to accurately measure the residual deflections. The 
panels with missing data were notated with either a NT for not tested, or UM for un-
measureable. 
Table 4.1 - Residual Deflection Data 
Residual Deflections (in) 
First Event Second Event 
Panel Mid Spans Mid Spans 
SFRC-3.5 38.0 UM NT NT 
SFRC-5.5 0.8 1.6 24.6 18.3 
1-RC 34.9 60.3 NT NT 
2-RC 28.6 31.0 NT NT 
1-H 10.3 12.3 NT 108.0 
2-H 5.6 6.0 50.8 23.8 
H-FG 21.4 25.4 NT NT 
H-A 6.4 6.4 62.6 27.8 
H-AlF 3.2 7.1 58.8 23.4 
H-FG-A/F UM 10.3 20.4 17.2 
H-B 2.4 3.2 UM 10.7 
H-B/F 1.3 1.6 UM 9.5 
H-FG-B/F 11.1 14.3 8.0 7.1 





·-1:1.) ~ 10 
5 
* The blast event was 1.4 kg with a 150 mm standoff 
**Measured on the SFRC layer after the FA-WF layer was cleared off 










-~ ~ 60.00 Q ~ 
~ 
-~ 







* Measured on the SFRC layer after the FA-WF layer was cleared off 
Figure 4.38 - Residual Deflection Data for the Second Event 
The residual deflection data showed the polyurea B panels performed the best 
with the SFRC-5.5 panel shortly behind. The residual deflections for the H-FG-B/F panel 
get smaller in the second event, which happened because the residual deflections taken 
after the first event were measured on the FA-WF and the residual deflections after the 
second event were measured on the SFRC layer because the FA-WF layer was nearly 
completely removed. The only two panels that had no bulging or hole after two blast 
events were the H-FG-A/F and H-FG-B/F panels, which indicates that these panels 
withstood the two blast events while maintaining structural integrity in the SFRC layer. 
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4.15 MASS LOSS 
Another source of quantitative data is estimated mass loss. The mass loss was 
estimated with the use of images and AutoCAD. A visual method was selected due to the 
complexity of determining a representative mass loss for a panel. Part of the complexity 
in finding the mass loss stemmed from the multiple layers. If a panel loses 26% of its 
original mass but it is all in the sacrificial layer, as is the case in the H-FG-A/F panel, the 
damage to the panel is insignificant but stating that the panel lost 26% of its mass 
indicates very significant damage. This meant that measuring the physical mass of the 
panel before and after blast testing was not representative of the actual damage. Another 
issue was the difficulty in measuring the physical mass at the Missouri S&T 
Experimental Mine. Even if the physical mass would have been taken visual methods 
would have had to have been used to differentiate the mass loss anyways. 
To determine the estimated mass loss an image that best showed the compression 
face of the panel was copied into AutoCAD. Then a polygon was drawn tracing the 
outside of the panel and additional polygons were drawn tracing the areas of damage. The 
areas of damage were then broken down into 3 area damage categories: Penetrating 
damage, sacrificial damage, contained damage. Once the area was drawn, the hatch 
feature in AutoCAD, which allows the drawer to fill in polygons with patterns, was used 
to differentiate the categories of damage. The area of damage described as contained 
damage were developed by drawing lines along the cracking on the top surface or 
estimated based on other images of the panel and is a very rough estimate. The other 
areas of damage were based on tracing the fracture lines. An area calculation tool in 
AutoCAD was utilized to determine the drawn areas. The area from the polygon that 
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traced the outside of the panel was compared to the calculated area of a typical panel 
which is 1.395 m2 (2162 in2) to develop a scale for damage found in the center of the 
panel. If the damage was not in the center of the panel then a line was drawn from side to 
side through the center of the damage. Then the length of the line drawn through the 
damage was compared to the length of the panel 1180 mm (46.5 in) to develop a scale. 
The appropriate scale was then multiplied with its corresponding area of damage to 
develop the scaled areas of damage. These scaled areas of damages were then multiplied 
by the depth of the layer they were in to develop a volume. The volume was then 
multiplied by the densities established in Section 3.2.4 to determine the mass of the area 
of damage. This value was compared to a calculated mass of the original panel to 
determine a percentage of damage. The data for estimated mass loss broken down by 
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Table 4.2- Estimated Mass Loss-By Category 
Estimated Mass Loss 
Penetrating Sacrificial Contained Total 
Panel (kg) (%) (kg) (%) (kg) (%) (kg) 
SFRC-3.5 0 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 
SFRC-5.5 4.195 0.947 N/A N/A N/A N/A 4.195 
1-RC** 34.53 12.25 N/A N/A N/A N/A 34.53 
2-RC* 0 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 
1-H 32.25 8.274 0 0 0 0 32.25 
2-H 16.18 4.152 20.03 5.14 0 0 36.22 
H-FG* 0 0 111.7 24.89 0 0 111.7 
H-A 0 0 37.54 9.632 19.8 5.082 57.34 
H-AlF 27.89 7.155 25.17 6.458 0 0 53.05 
H-FG-A/F 0 0 99.25 22.13 0 0 99.25 
H-B 0 0 2.026 0.52 2.026 0.52 4.053 
H-B/F 0 0 1.769 0.454 10.55 2.706 12.32 
H-FG-B/F 0 0 276.6 27.97 0 0 276.6 
* Indicates one blast event at 310 mm standoff tested 
* * Indicates one blast event at 150 mm standoff tested 
















The penetrating damage mass loss is the worst damage as it is an estimation of the 
material to penetrate through the panel creating shrapnel or fragmentation that can greatly 
contribute to injuries and loss of life. Comparing the penetrating damage bars it was 
obvious that the polyurea panels are much better at preventing this damage. Only one 
panel that contains polyurea, the H-A/F panel, had any penetrating damage and this was 
the result of a significant tear in thee-glass DFRP layer. 
The contained damage indicates a loss of strength m the base panel from 
fragmented pieces that are trapped in the bulging polyurea layer. This damage is the 
second most harmful as it does indicate a loss in strength, and could cause the structure to 
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collapse, if it occurs in a structural component. Comparing this damage indicates that the 
two foam-gap panels with DFRP performed the best as they ended up with no contained 
damage, meaning the base SFRC layer was more intact and less likely to contribute to a 
collapse. 
The sacrificial damage is from pieces of the sacrificial FA-WF layer breaking off. 
The sacrificial damage is the least harmful because it occurs on the exterior of the 
structural component making the chance this damage causing any additional harm 
unlikely. When comparing this damage the foam-gap panels had significantly more 
damage than rest of the panels, which was expected. 
Overall the panels that performed the best according to mass loss were the foam-
gap panels withe-glass DFRP. The reason why the H-FG, SFRC-3.5, and 2-RC panels do 
not rank better is they were only tested with one blast event. A good indicator of the 
damage of the second event can be determined by comparing the damage between 1-RC 
and 2-RC. The 1-RC was subjected to only the 150 mm (6.0 in) blast event and has over 
12% mass loss where the 2-RC was subjected to only the 310 mm (12 in) blast event and 
has no recordable mass loss. This shows that despite the lack of damage in the H-FG, 
SFRC-3.5, and 2-RC panels they would have significant damage from the second event. 
Also only the 1-RC panel had any damage beyond just sacrificial damage after one blast 
event. 
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5. FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study consisted of the blast testing of 13 composite concrete panels. Testing 
was performed at the Missouri S&T Experimental Mine and consisted of two 1.4 kg (3 
lb) charges of an RDX based C-4 explosive at two different stand-off distances. The 
objective of this research was to determine the performance of FA-WF in combination 
with SFRC and E-glass DFRP at resisting blast damage. The following is the findings, 
conclusions and further recommendations drawn from this investigation: 
• The sacrificial high volume fly ash-wood fiber (FA-WF) material provided an 
improvement over no additional layer. The 1-H, 2-H panels saw less 
significant residual deflections and cracking after the first blast event than the 
SFRC-3.5 panel. 
• The control panels with the FA-WF layer (1-H and 2-H) did not perform as 
well as the SFRC-5.5 panel. This indicates that an additional 50 mm (2 in) of 
SFRC is a more effective way resisting blast damage compared to a sacrificial 
layer alone. 
• An investigation considering cost would be useful. The additional 50 rnm (2 
in) of SFRC proved to be better at resisting blast than 50 mm (2 in) ofF A-
WF. However, the FA-WF material is significantly less expensive than the 
SFRC material so if cost was considered it may find that FA-WF is a more 
cost effective way to resist blast. However, the FA-WF may also present some 
aesthetic concerns for architects. 
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• An investigation comparing using SFRC and FA-WF as a retrofitting layer 
would allow for a better comparison between the two materials. In the SFRC-
5.5 panel, one lift of 140 mm (5.5 in) is not comparative to two separate lifts, 
which is present in the hybrid panels. 
• The foam-gap significantly reduced the damage in the base layer. The foam-
gaps present some issues though, they create a large amount of fragments on 
the blast side of the panel that may contribute to damage and injuries 
experienced outside the structure, although it is unlikely the fragmented pieces 
will cause significant damage beyond the blast wave effects to humans. 
Another related issue is that if a missile or two blast events are used the 
impact of the missile or first blast event is likely to reduce the sacrificial layer 
to rubble exposing the base layer. 
• Future research should include a way to improve the foam-gap system. This 
could be achieved by using SFRC instead of FA-WF or by using mesh 
reinforcement in the layer on top of the foam-gap. Also the construction of the 
foam-gap can be improved by using a form that has a sturdy removable sheet 
to form the foam-gap or by using sheet metal. 
• Future research should include a plain control panel tested with a standoff 
distance that would be equivalent to the standoff distance to the base layer in 
the foam gap panels. In other words a plain SFRC panel should be tested at a 
standoff of 430 mm (17 in) which is equivalent to the 310 mm (12.0 in) 
standoff in the foam gap panel after adding the 75 mm (3.0 in) styrofoam 
layer and 50 mm (2 in) FA-WF layer. After comparing the damage in the two 
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panels you could better determine if the reason for the decreased damage in 
the foam gap panels is due to increasing the standoff distance or if it is 
contributable to shock impedance mismatch. 
• Future research should include a way to improve the bond between the SFRC 
and FA-WF to improve the FA-WF material's resiliency. The bond between 
the SFRC and FA-WF layers was very weak and may have resulted in some of 
the poor results. 
• The panels with polyurea, in general, performed better than those without. The 
only two exceptions are the H-A/F and SFRC-5.5 panel. For all the panels 
except the H-A/F panel, the polyurea layer contained fragmented pieces, not 
allowing any material to penetrate the panel. This indicates that polyurea may 
be a lifesaving material, when used on walls of structures that are prone to 
explosive attacks. 
• The e-glass DFRP had mixed results. The H-A/F panel tore allowing a 
significant amount of material to penetrate the panel. This was due mostly to 
the high fiber ratio present in the c-glass DFRP A, which resulted in a stiffer 
material that tore at a low elongation. The rest of the panels (H-B/F, H-FG-
A/F, and H-FG-B/F) all showed signs that the polyurea layer added stiffness 
to the panel system. This was evident by the lower residual deflection values 
for these panels compared to the control and plain polyurea panels. 
• Future research should include a better mechanism of integrating the glass 
fiber into the polyurea. One possibility is a better chopping and spraying 
mechanism like what is used in the fiberglass industry or using a mesh and 
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rolling it on and covering it with polyurea. A better mechanism of integrating 
fiber may also allow for other fiber type to be used, such as aramid and 
carbon. 
• Future research should investigate the use of discrete fiber polyurea on a wall 
system. In other words a full scale test including either a concrete panel wall 
or concrete masonry unit wall. 
• Future research should include multiple test panels of the same configuration. 
Multiples of each type of specimen add to the confidence in the final data. 
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APPENDIX A: TEST SETUP DRAWINGS 
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~----------------------1181.10----------------------~ 
Unit conversion 1.0 mm=0.039 in 
Figure A.1- Panels SFRC-3.5, 1-RC, and 2-RC Profile in mm 
1-----------------------11 81 . 1 0-------------------------1 
t 
SFRC 139.70 { 
Unit conversion 1.0 mm=0.039 in 




Unit conversion 1.0 mm=0.039 in 
Figure A.3- Panels 1-H, 2-H, H-A, H-AlF, H-B, H-B/F Profile in mm 
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Unit conversion 1.0 mm=0.039 in 
Figure A.4- Panels H-FG, H-FG-AIF, H-FG=B/F Profile in mm 
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Figure A.5- Blast Test Setup for 310 mm Standoff or First Event 
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Figure A.8 - Coupon Test Specimen 
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APPENDIX 8: CONWEP GRAPHS 
Pressure Distribution 
Charge weight: 3 pounds Composition C-4 
Standoff distance: 12 inches 
Unit conversions: 1.0 psi=6.9 KPa, 1.0 in=25 mm 











































Charge weight: 3 pounds Composition C-4 
Standoff distance: 6 inches 
Unit conversions: 1.0 psi=6.9 KPa, 1 in=25 mm 
























APPENDIX C: DFRP TENSILE DATA 
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Table C.l - Coupon Test for Polyurea A with Discrete E-glass Fibers 
Yield Stress Strain@ Stress@ Strain@ 
(MPa) Yield(%) MOE (MPa) Break (MPa) Break(%) Quality of Test 
A/F-1 1. 751241037 0.76 297.111142 3.461114175 4.04 Very Poor-Grips 
A/F-2 1.3858246 0.45 507.549641 4.474627689 14.26 Good 
A/F-3 2.592388307 2.52 190.237176 3.805846663 4.66 Poor-Bubbles 
A/F-4 1.482349697 0.35 862.610314 4.488416988 6.22 Good 
A/F-5 1.027302813 0.55 266.347215 2. 985383343 8.33 Poor-Bubbles 
A/F-6 1.833976834 1.28 164.285714 5.136514065 14.65 Good 
A/F-7 1.640926641 0.63 375.013789 4.116105902 6.78 Poor-Bubbles 
A/F-8 1.592664093 0.58 396.594043 4. 619415334 7.81 Poor-Bubbles 
A/F-9 1.39271925 0.51 419.105074 3.833425262 5.2 Poor-Bubbles 
A/F-10 1.634031991 0.57 414.761445 4. 943463872 11.59 Good 
A/F-11 2.158025372 0.63 475.130998 5.894925538 8.07 Good 
A/F-12 1.820187534 0.49 601.896029 5.074462217 8.11 Good 
A/F-13 1.578874793 0.39 753.957529 4.543574186 9.03 Good 
A/F-14 1. 289299504 0.42 534.418092 4.902095974 10.46 Poor-Bubbles 
A/F-15 1.151406509 0.55 297.262824 3.440430226 7.04 Poor-Bubbles 
A/F-16 1.578874793 0.36 967.932984 5.467457253 8.45 Poor-Bubbles 
A/F-17 2.027027027 0.98 249.862107 5.632928847 10.27 Good 
Average 1. 64336004 7 0.70705882 457.298595 4.518834561 8.52764706 
Std. Dev. 0.379549852 0.52269452 229.727654 0.823077453 3.00469119 
cov 1.592385854 0.73925181 3.46358316 1.255817331 0.35234704 
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Table C.2 - Coupon Test for Polyurea B with Discrete E-glass Fibers 
Yield Stress Strain@ MOE Stress@ Strain@ 
(MPa) Yield(%) (MPa) Break (MPa) Break(%) Quality of Test 
B/F-1 2.275234418 0.64 489.8235 5. 701875345 12.97 Poor-Bubbles 
B/F-2 3.792057363 2.06 206.281 3. 936845008 3.08 Poor-Bubbles 
B/F-3 2.033921677 1.31 174.9173 4.074738003 17.37 Poor-Bubbles 
B/F-4 2.619966906 0.35 1206.019 4.198841699 1.38 Very Poor-Grips 
B/F-5 2.551020408 1.18 251.0411 4.612520684 16 Poor-Bubbles 
B/F-6 2.516547159 1.06 282.9426 4.805570877 11.13 Poor-Bubbles 
B/F-7 2. 523441809 1.61 170.8081 4. 336734694 37.27 Good 
B/F-8 3. 764478764 1.51 277.2339 5.108935466 3.93 Poor-Bubbles 
B/F-9 2.426916713 1.46 183.4322 4.881412024 44.82 Good 
B/F-10 1. 241036955 0.87 170.3392 1.95118588 25.36 Poor-Bubbles 
B/F-12 2.151130723 1.35 177.4821 4.43325979 25.33 Good 
B/F-13 3.536955323 1.9 211.5003 5.384721456 26.08 Poor-Bubbles 
B/F-14 2.557915058 1.78 153.9162 4.805570877 56.74 Good 
B/F-15 3.006067292 0.86 444.0017 6.10176503 13.21 Poor-Bubbles 
B/F-16 1.647821291 1.64 109.356 5.467457253 24.72 Poor-Bubbles 
B/F-17 2. 564809708 1.87 149.9035 4.357418643 33.49 Good 
B/F-18 2. 364864865 1.15 237.0794 4. 702151131 38.43 Good 
Average 2.563187437 1.329412 288.0045 4.63888258 23.018235 
Std. Oev. 0.674604262 0.472579 257.0185 0.911526528 15.483116 
cov 1.814600072 0.35548 6.152863 1.354778019 0.6726457 
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Figure D.2 - Coupon Test for Polyurea B with Discrete E-glass Fibers 
APPENDIX E: CRACK WIDTH ESTIMATION FIGURES 
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Figure E.l - Flexural Cracks in the Front Face of SFRC-3.5 
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Figure E.2 -Flexural Cracks in the Back Face of SFRC 5.5, 2nd Event 
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Figure E.3 - Flexural Cracks in the Back Face of 1-RC 
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Figure E.4 - Shear Cracks in the Front Face of 1-RC 
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Figure E.5 - Flexural Cracks in the Front Face of 2-RC 
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Figure E.6 -Flexural Cracks in the Front Face of 1-H, 1st Event 
Figure E.7 - Flexural and Shear Cracks in the Front Face of 1-H, 2"d Event 
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Figure E.8 -Flexural Cracks in the Back Face of 2-H, 1 t Event 
Figure E.9 - Flexural Cracks in the Back Face of 2-H, 2nd Event 
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Figure E.lO- Flexural Cracks in the Front Face of H-FG, 2nd Event 
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Figure E.ll -Flexural Cracks in the Front Face of H-A, 2nd Event 
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Figure E.12 - Flexural Cracks in the Back Face of H-AlF, 2nd Event 
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Figure E.13 - Flexural Cracks in the Back Face of H-FG-A/F, 2"d Event 
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Figure E.14- Shear Cracks in the Front Face of H-B, 1st Event 
Figure E.15 - Shear Cracks in the Front Face of H-B, 2nd Event 
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Figure E.16- Flexural and Shear Cracks in the Front Face of H-B/F, 2"d Event 
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Figure E.17- Flexural Cracks in the Front Face of H-FG-B/F, 2"d Event 
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